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Abstract. 
 
Democratization has been one of the main policy goals towards reducing internal conflicts in the 
last decade. However, recent conflict research, and recent events such as the many riots in 
European democracies, show that the relationship between democracy and internal peace is not 
as clear-cut as previously thought. This thesis uses new automatically coded event data to 
perform a statistical analysis of the relationship between regime and six types of internal conflict. 
I find strong support that democracies see more non-violent conflicts than other regimes. I also 
find strong support that authoritarian regimes see fewer of any conflicts than other regimes. 
Finally, I find mixed evidence on democracies and violent conflict; while democracies have a 
smaller chance of violent conflict initiation, they see more violent conflict events of some types 
than other regimes.  
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1.0 Introduction 
 
 
 
In modern times, democracy is often considered a particularly peaceful form of government 
where internal conflicts are solved through non-violent means. After the Second World War a 
series of researchers of international relations reassessed the old idea of a republican peace and 
applied it to modern democracies (Babst 1964, Doyle 1986). This thesis was, in more recent 
research, extended to internal conflicts, and for a time a partial consensus formed in around the 
idea of a civil democratic peace (Hegre et al 2001). The relationship of regime type was found to 
be an inverted- u where both democracies and authoritarian regimes had fewer internal conflicts 
than anocracies. However, findings in research that has disaggregated conflict, spatial and regime 
variables have found that this relationship does not hold (Buhaug 2006, Collier & Rhoner 2008, 
Sobek &Payne 2010). In addition, some major problems have been discovered in the data used to 
find the inverted-u relationship (Vreeland 2008). One of the key developmental policies of the 
early 21st century has been the promotion of democratic institutions, but is democracy 
necessarily as internally peaceful as once believed? Or is perhaps the democratic peace liked 
only to certain kinds of conflict? 
 
This thesis seeks to analyze the relationship of regime types and conflict types by using new 
automatically coded event data. The thesis seeks to uncover more knowledge of the relationship 
between democracy and conflict through disaggregation of conflict types. The research question 
of the thesis is: Are some conflict types more prominent in democracies than other regimes? 
 
 
The motivation of the paper is twofold. First, it is interesting to uncover more knowledge of the 
relationship between regime and conflict in light of the wave of protests, riots and other small-
scale violence in Europe in the early 21st century (Taylor 2013, Wagner 2013). In addition, the 
unexpected eruption of The Arabian Spring reiterates the question of why, when and where 
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political conflicts turn violent. 
Secondly, the paper is theoretical interesting. The research front in conflict studies involves a 
process of bring the state back in as an actor in conflict analysis, disaggregating variables to 
more precise typologies, and of marrying the civil war and international relations centered 
conflict research tradition with research on non- violent political conflict. In recent years conflict 
research has been characterized by a trend of disaggregation of data (Gleditch et al 2014). 
Conflicts, regimes, state capacity, ethnicity and other important variables in the field have been 
broken down into typologies that are more precise in order to create a more accurate 
understanding of casual mechanisms. This thesis explores the possibility of using new 
automatically coded data to aid this effort. Building on efforts to uncover the relationship 
between regime types and conflict this paper seeks to disaggregate conflict types in order to see 
if the same relationship between regime and conflict can be found. Research has revealed that the 
inverted-u curve of regime and conflict does not hold when civil war is disaggregated or in 
regard to other types of political violence (Buhaug 2006, Collier & Rohner 2008). In fact 
democracy has been found to have a positive effect on certain types of conflict, will a similar 
relationship be revealed if non-violent as well as asymmetric conflict types are also analyzed? 
This thesis seeks to aid this effort by disaggregating conflict variables and analysis both violent 
and non-violent conflicts. Even if this thesis finds no interesting relationships between regime 
and conflict, it should at least discover something about the possibilities for using automatically 
coded event data to aid variable disaggregation.  
 
 
In order to answer the research question I construct a data set of conflict event data where a large 
typology of conflict is aggregated to six conflict types, and tests the relationship between these 
conflict types and regime using zero inflated negative binomial regression. 
 
The thesis finds strong support that democracies have more incidents of non-violent protests, and 
that authoritarian regimes have fewer conflicts of any type. Democracy is found to have a mixed 
effect on some types of violent conflict. On the one hand, democracies have a greater chance 
than anocracies of avoiding conflict initiation; on the other hand, they experience more events 
when conflict occurs.  
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The paper consists of three sections. The first section presents the theory behind the thesis. This 
section has there objectives; (1) It seeks to review the previous research and the findings from 
this in order to (2) explain the theoretical part of the motivation for the thesis, and finally (3) to 
present the theoretical logic behind the analysis. The section begins by explaining the research 
done on conflict then moves on to consider theories of political conflict. In the end of this section 
I use the theory and empirical findings presented to craft hypothesis about the expected 
relationship between regime and conflict. 
   
The second section deals with the method of the thesis and methodological challenges of it. The 
section starts with describing the statistical method and explaining the reasons why this approach 
was chosen. It then moves on to consider the data on the dependent variables and show how this 
data was constructed. Then it will consider the data on regime and on the control variables, 
before it finally considers the regression models of the analysis and presents descriptive 
statistics.  
 
The finally section of the thesis contains the findings from the analysis and my discussion of 
them. The analysis consists of three steps. In step, one the relationship between regime and 
conflict is considered in a series of binary models. In step two I seek to improve upon this model 
by including control variables. In step three, I seek to check whether the unexpected findings in 
step two can be due to methodological problems and to test for curvilinear relationships, 
interaction and extreme case effects. 
 
Finally, I conclude what my findings are and how this thesis can be improved upon by further 
research.     
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2.0 Theory & Research 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will review the literature that is most relevant for this paper. The purpose of this 
is to set the paper in context of this research, in order to make clear its theoretical motivation. 
There are mainly three sources of research that is examined here: research on regimes, on social 
movements and dissidence, as well as research on civil wars and other violent conflicts. The 
reason the I review research and theory form so many different research traditions is that the 
subject of this paper lies at a crossroads between these research traditions. However, the 
principal literature that this paper is based on is quantitative research done on governance and 
conflict after the end of the cold war, particularly research done on civil war. 
 
As this paper seeks to investigate variations in onset of intrastate political conflict this chapter 
reviews mostly research done on that, and not on duration, severity or interstate conflict. 
  
Before the research review, it is necessary to define some terms used in this paper. 
First, regime is central to this paper and I frequently refers to the standard typology of 
democracy, anocracy and authoritarian regimes. This typology is an oversimplification of the far 
more complex political reality, however it is sensible for several practical reasons. Since this 
paper relies on the Polity IV projects data on regime it is only natural that it apply its definitions 
of the various regime types as well. Polity IV defines democracy as: 
 
“Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. 
One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective 
preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized 
constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all 
citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation (Marshall, & Jaggers 2013: 14)” 
 
Authoritarian regimes are countries that are, by and large, defined by what democratic features 
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they don't have. They are often referred to as autocracies in the literature, a term that I have 
chosen to avoid as it can also refer to the rule of one-person specifically. Polity IV defines 
authoritarian regimes as: 
 
“Autocracies [Authoritarian regimes] sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their 
chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once 
in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints. (Marshall, & Jaggers 2013: 15)” 
 
 
Anocracy is an even more elusive concept that really exists only to brand countries that don't fit 
the bill of either democratic or authoritarian. They are also often referred to as mixed regimes 
and frequently thought of as inherently unstable. Polity IV defines anocracy as: 
 
“Anocracies are a middling category rather than a distinct form of governance. They are countries whose 
governments are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic but, rather, combine an, often, incoherent mix of 
democratic and autocratic traits and practices (Cole & Marshall 2011: 9)” 
 
This paper seeks to investigate the effect of regime on many forms of conflict, however I 
frequently refer simply to conflict. By conflict I refer to any political conflict, similarly the term 
dissidence is used to refer to participation in any kind of conflict. I attempt to review research 
done on all the conflict categories that I use in my analysis, but the majority of research reviewed 
here comes from civil war research. The reason for this is that civil war research is vary 
expansive and has lately begun comparing civil war to other conflict types, and disaggregating 
civil war into more accurate and narrow categories.   
 
This chapter will begin by reviewing what we know of internal conflict from empirical studies. 
Then review the two major theories that attempt to explain internal conflict, and finally based on 
theory and empiric findings construct hypothesis about what I will find in the analysis. What 
conflicts are in the data and how they get there is covered in the methodology section, for now a 
theoretical definition of conflict will do. The Norwegian Lexicon of Political Science defines 
conflict as: 
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“The competition between political actors over goods or values [my own translation] (Østerud 2007: 135)” 
 
This is a quite broad definition, but also quite apt as this paper seeks to explore broad range of 
conflicts.  
 
 
 
2.2 Recent Research and Empirical Research 
 
Instead of dealing with this section chronologically I will start with the article that poses the 
question this paper is mainly interested in, then I will deal with the literature that forms the basis 
of it, then the literature that has expanded on it. The reason for this is that the work done in the 
last 20- ish years is the most relevant to this paper, and the one that best explain the theoretical 
relevancy and motivation for the paper. 
 
Hegre et al (2001) conduct a statistical analysis of civil war and regime where they conclude that 
democracies have fewer civil wars than other regimes. The article builds on the previous work 
done on democracy and conflict that focused on interstate wars, and applied this to civil war. The 
article found that democracies had fewer civil wars while autocracies had more than democracies 
but less than anocracies (Hegre et al 2001). The article is based on data from 1816 to 1992, and 
tests for the effect of regime and regime change on the risk of civil war. They find that civil wars 
are far more common in anocracies than in democracies and authoritarian regimes. They describe 
this relationship as an inverted-u. Hegre et al (2001) are not the first to show this relationship, 
but they are the first to show it in data of this magnitude.  
 
Below I will show first that a similar relationship had previously been found in similar inquiries, 
and how research in the last ten years has begun to sow doubts of it. The multiple findings of the 
inverted-u relationship between governance and conflict was taken by many as major evidence 
of what is known as the democratic peace thesis. This thesis has a long history, some of which 
will be looked more closely at bellow. It states that democracy as a form of government is based 
on the idea of providing ways to resolve conflicts peacefully. Therefore, if all governments were 
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democracies there would be perpetual peace. Immanuel Kant (1795) was the first to develop this 
idea. He claims that republics will not go to war with each other, as republics would have more 
to gain from peace and trade (Kant 1795). The extension of Kants (1795) idea of a republican 
peace to modern democracies has seen some theoretical critique, see Gates, Moses & Knudsen 
(1996) and Danilove & Clare (2007). 
 
Later Babst (1964) Doyle (1986) and Rummel (1995, 1997) make extensive inquiries into the 
relationship between regimes and conflict, and conclude that democracies were more peaceful 
than other regimes. These enquirers were mostly concerned with, and most conclusive, in the 
case of interstate war. Though their research Kants (1795) idea is applied to modern democracies 
Babst (1964) made an insightful inquiry into the relationship between regime and interstate war 
in the first and second world wars. He compared the relative amount of countries that had elected 
versus non-elected governments amongst the entente (allies) and axis respectively. He found that 
the allies had overwhelmingly elected governments while the axis had overwhelmingly non-
elected governments.   
 
Doyle (1986) preforms a more theoretical work where he reexamines the theoretical works of 
Machiavelli, Kant and Schumpeter in view of recent research in modern political science. Doyle 
(1986) thus takes the reformation and enlightenment idea of the republican peace and puts it in 
context of modern democracy after the Second World War.   
 
Rummel (1995) does a large study of the relationship between regime and conflict were he finds 
that democracies are over all more peaceful than other regimes. Rummel also (1995: 85) does an 
analysis the results of as many studies he could find on the subject from before 1980 and 
concludes that democracies are more internally peaceful. 
 
Maoz and Russet (1993) made an investigation of the relationship between democracy and 
conflict on the international scene where they find that democracies are about as likely to be 
involved in wars as other regimes, but are less likely to be at war with each other. They then go 
on to examine why this could be. They present two different models to explain the negative 
effect on democracy, and test for both of them. The first model is the normative; which states that 
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democracies are less prove to conflict between each other because norms of compromise and 
cooperation are prevalent in democratic societies. The structural model claims that the 
institutional structure of democracies but constraints on leaders that make conflicts harder to 
escalate (Maoz & Russet 1993: 1). They find that there is support for both models, but that the 
support for the normative model is more robust. 
 
Krain and Myers (1997) are among the first to investigate the democratic peace theory in themes 
of civil war. Inspired by Rummels (1995) work on state violence and regime they hypothesize 
that democracies should experience fewer years of civil war than other regimes. They conduct a 
chi-square analysis of democracy and civil war using the correlates of war data set and polity III 
data on regime. They find that democracies do have fewer civil wars (Krain and Myers 1997: 
113). 
 
It is worth mentioning that similar inquiries were made at his time by researchers mainly 
interested in democracy as a phenomenon rather than political conflict. Powell (1982) makes a 
large study of all the consolidated democracies at that time, where he investigates into many 
aspects of them including internal conflict. Many of these results are quite interesting, while they 
do naturally not illustrate the difference between conflicts in democracies and other regimes, as it 
makes no such comparison. Powell (1982) finds that most violence in democracies comes from 
organized groups and is directed at the government or at other political opponents, also he finds 
that separatist violence can be particularly problematic in democracies and that population size is 
the largest contributor to violence on its own (Powell 1982:126, 154, 159).  Krain (1998) does an 
updated version of Powells (1982) analysis, where he uses updated analytic methods concerning 
event counts (that we will return to in the methodology chapter). Krain (1998: 161) finds quite 
different results using Powells (1982) data; he mainly finds that material and representation 
problems have a larger impact than grievance problems. 
 
Similarly, some research has been done on variation in use of repression that touches on some of 
the same dynamics as dissidence, as the two naturally correlate. Findings from this research 
mirrors findings from research of political conflict, as there has generally been found an inverted 
– U relationship of regime and repression (Markus & Nesvold 1972, Hibbs 1973, Muller & 
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Weede 1990,  Moore 1998,  Eck & Hultman 2007, Henderson & Ragan 2013). As a general 
tendency both democracies and autocracies repress less than anocracies. This is due to the fact 
that repression is sometimes met with increased or intensified dissent, and sometimes by 
decreased dissent. The logic of winch of these two happen is the same as the logic of whether or 
not dissent should be attempted in the first place. In democracies it is often more useful to 
engage through legal channels while in autocracies the repression can be so harsh that the fear of 
it alone is enough to silence dissidents. Anocracies on the other hand fall in between these two 
extremes in regime type, and therefore repression leads to escalation in violence, which means 
that by extension the form of political conflict is influenced by regime (Markus & Nesvold 1972, 
Hibbs 1973, Muller & Weede 1990, Moore 1998,  Eck & Hultman 2007, Henderson & Ragan 
2013). 
 
It is interesting that such a similar relationship has also been found by those who are looking at 
the situation from the other side, so to speak. As exceptions to the inverted – U relationship have 
been found with regard to types of dissidence, could there be similar exceptions in terms of type 
of repression? That is a question for a different inquiry, as shall be seen later Gurr (1970) says 
that the natural reaction to violence is violence, and that if this reaction is not alleviated a cycle 
of violence can quickly form which it is very difficult to break free. In relation to the inverted-u 
model it seems that consolidated democracies and autocracies have the means to break it while 
anocracies do not. 
 
Built on this research a partial consensus was begging to form around the inverted-u curve 
relationship of regime and internal conflict, a civil democratic peace. However, in later research 
evidence has been found that casts serious doubt on these propositions.  
    
  
 
2.3 Economic Development & The Liberal Peace Proposition 
 
Along with democracy, economic development has been the number one policy implication of 
civil war research after the end of the cold war (Dixon 2009, Enia et al 2011). Gratzke (2007) 
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takes this argument further and offers up an alternative explanation to the democratic peace 
where he points to the fact that many democracies are in fact rather wealthy, and presents 
empirical evidence that the democratic peace is better explained by capitalism. Democracy and 
peace are both seen as results of economic development. This has in turn been developed into the 
proposition of a larger liberal peace rather than a democratic one. In this model liberal norms of 
free market and free trade along with a more narrow definition of liberal democracy rather than 
simply institutional democracy, are seen to promote peace when operating together (Mousseau 
2009, Schnider 2014). 
   
Collier and Rohner (2008) investigate the relationship between wealth, democracy and peace. 
They find that the effect of democracy is as expected from democratic peace theory when 
democracy coincides with economic development. However, the effect of democracy was found 
to be positive on civil war in poor countries (Collier & Rohner 2008: 538). One the other hand 
economic development is found to make authoritarian regimes more prone to political violence. 
Furthermore, of great interest to this paper, Collier and Rohners (2008) investigation goes into 
the relationship between democracy, economic development and several types of conflict. They 
look at riots, coups d'etat, assassinations, demonstrations and strikes. In the case of: riots, strikes, 
demonstrations and assassinations democracy is found to have a positive effect, for other types of 
conflict the effect is statistically insignificant (Collier & Rohner 2008: 537). Except when in 
conjunction with economic development where it has negative effect on all but coups d’états, 
which effect is statistically insignificant (Collier & Rohner 2008: 537). This is very interesting; 
not only do they find that democracy has a positive effect on many kinds of violent conflict, they 
also find no negative effect on civil war from democracy. The positive effect of democracy on 
demonstrations and strikes is to be expected, these things are part of everyday politics in 
democracies, but the effect on riots and assassinations is unexpected. Democracy is, as shall be 
seen in the theory section, is often thought of as a means to peacefully resolve conflicts. It is 
therefore unexpected to find that democracies have more of these kinds of conflicts, and it will 
be interesting to see if similar results will be found using event data. 
 
Schneider (2014) and Schneider & Gleditsch (2014) review the literature on the capitalist peace. 
They claim that the discussion is not yet over as there are good arguments on both sides, but that 
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the capitalist peace has seen substantial empirical support, but that it faces a difficulty in lacking 
micro level causal links and could benefit from the arrival of 'big data'. 
Whatever the link between economic development, capitalism, democracy and peace is, it seems 
reasonable to me that at this point to assume that there is some link, and it seems necessary to 
account for the effect of economic development.   
  
 
2.3.1 Lootable resources 
 
One factor that is often seen in relation to economic development is the presence of lootable 
resources that can 'fuel' a civil war (Dixon 2009). This is only supported by evidence concerning 
diamonds and oil (Dixon 2009), and in some research the evidence is less supportive all round. 
Buhaug & Rød (2006) find that that diamonds have a negative effect on territorial conflicts and a 
positive effect on governmental conflict. Sobek & Payne (2010) find that lootable resources have 
a positive effect on civil war onset when they coincide with low government capacity, and have 
the opposite effect when government capacity is high. This makes intuitive sense, as a stable and 
capable government might use such a recourse as a means to strengthen themselves, unstable and 
infective governments would be unable to do so. The resources then becomes an incentive for 
rebels, who are motivated by greed. The reason for this is that rebels must try to make rebellion 
more viable for potential recruits by changing the cost/benefit relationship; one way to do this is 
to offer an economic incentive, often through the use of loot. There is however consensus that oil 
and civil war correlate (Dixon 2009). 
 
The idea of a liberal peace undermined the argument of the democratic peace thesis as it moves 
the causality. Institutional democracy is not seen as a cause of peace, but peace and democracy 
are both seen as results of liberal norms and free markets.   
 
2.4 Disaggregation of Variables. 
 
Several articles published before and after Hegre et al (2001) recognize that civil wars are not a 
uniform set of events, but wary in their objectives (Collier & Hoffler 1998, Sobek and Payne 
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2010: 216). Consequently, there has been an effort to disaggregated civil war in later research. 
This effort has also changed opinions on the democratic peace thesis as it has revealed 
correlations that contradict it.   
 
As mentioned in the introduction Buhaug (2006) does an analysis of civil war where he 
distinguishes between civil wars aimed at establishing a new state in part of the current state 
(territorial), and those aimed at taking over the power in the current country (governmental). He 
argues that weak states will have more governmental conflicts while strong states will have more 
territorial conflicts (Buhaug 2006). The basis for this argument is that rebels are rational actors 
and will adjust their goals to their capabilities (Buhaug 2006: 692). Buhaug (2006) performs an 
analysis of civil war from 1946 to 1999 measuring the effect of a set of independent variables 
including regime. The results of the analysis are interesting as they break with the conventional 
wisdom that democracies have fewer civil war than other regimes. Buhaug (2006: 705) shoves 
that democracies in fact have more territorial civil wars than other regimes, the effect is also 
strongest in consolidated democracies. As mentioned in the introduction it is this finding along 
with the evidence from Hegre et al (2001) that is the basis for this paper; the purpose being to see 
if evidence can be found, using new event data, that democracy has a similarly different effect on 
other types of political conflict. Buhaug (2006) hypothesizes and concludes that it is the relative 
capabilities of rebels vs states that dictate their goals. In relation to regime he finds that 
democracies have more territorial civil wars than authoritarian regimes, He offers the explanation 
that while it is difficultly to legitimize a civil war against the democratic regime it shelf, it is 
possible for democratic regimes to host people of a different ethical or religious identity, who 
will desire independence (Buhaug 2006).   
  
In the study of terrorism, a similar focus on rational actors has evolved (Sandler 2014).  
James Piazza (2008) conducts an empirical test of the effect of democracy on terrorism, using 
country year data created from totaling up the number of events for a country in a year. He finds 
that democracy and free markets are not significant predictors of terrorism. His study is 
interesting not just, because it analyses the same relationship as this paper, but it also uses the 
same methodological approach. However, Piazza uses the problematic Polity and Freedom 
House indicators that are endogenous to regime, see the methodology section for the details 
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(Vreeland 2008). Yet he still does not find regime to be a significant predictor of terrorist events. 
It may be that the problematic indicators are therefore mostly problematic in relation to civil war.  
 
Sandler (2014) writes a review article about the most prominent findings in the study of 
terrorism. In relation to regime, Sandler (2014) emphasizes that democracies are put in a 
dilemma by terrorism. If the government fail to react to terrorist threats, they will lose legitimacy 
because they are seen as incapable of protecting their people. If they do react, it is difficult to 
combat terrorism without trampling people’s democratic rights (Sandler 2014). The US reaction 
to the attacks of September 11th serves as a good example. The recently revealed National 
Security Agency’s massive surveillance program and the extraordinary powers given to law 
enforcement through the patriot act are clearly at odds with principles of privacy and being 
innocent until the opposite is proven. Yet the rationale behind these programs is easy to 
understand, as without surveillance terrorist plots can be very difficult to uncover, and if they are 
uncovered they can be difficult to prove. This may cause terrorist to target democracies, as they 
know they are likely to have effect, as the balance of appropriate response to terrorism can be 
difficult to find. Similarly democratic freedoms can make the organization and execution terrorist 
activities easier as it involves freedom of association, communication etc. A similar point is made 
by Li (2005) who claims that democracy has a positive effect on terrorism in the form of 
increased freedoms, along with a negative effect in the form of alleviating grievances that cause 
terrorism in the first place. It may be then that democracies because of this dual relationship 
could be associated with international terrorism, but not with domestic terrorism.  
Building on Buhaugs (2006) analysis Sobek & Payne (2010) expand the typology of civil wars 
by separating governmental wars into two further categories; (1) wars where the objective was to 
remove the government (replacement), and (2) wars that seek to change the entire relationship 
between government and society (legitimacy). Interestingly Sobek & Payne (2010:236) find no 
statistically significant relationship between regime type and either form of civil war. They do 
however find significant effects from government capacity, and criticize previous civil war 
research for representing capacity with a regime variable (Sobek & Payne 2010). 
 
Another aspect of this disaggregation of conflict has been done in recent conflict research is that 
there has been increasing interest in non-violent forms of conflict, at the same time as 
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sociological studies of these phenomena are becoming more quantitative (Ackerman & 
Karatnycky 2005, Chenoweth & Stepahn 2008). Protests, strikes, boycotts and similar non- 
violent forms of dissidence have been given more attention in the wake of The Arab Spring, The 
Occupy Movement and the waves of riots in Europe in the last decade. These events have on the 
on side inspired an interest in the potentially unstable aspects of democracies, and on the other an 
interest in the nature of non-violent resistance in non-democracies.  
 
Cunningham (2013) analyses violent and non-violent strategies in self-determination conflicts in 
an attempt to unlock the logic of why some dissidents choose violence and some non-violence. 
She begins with criticizing that violent and non-violent strategies have been studied as separate 
phenomenon, and the heavy focus on civil war. She argues that dissidents turn to irregular tactics 
when they do not achieve their goals thorough normal channels, or if no normal channels exist 
(Cunningham 2013: 294). Groups choose violent tactics when they seem more effective than 
non-violence. Additionally she points out that violent tactics, especially terrorism, requires fewer 
people than non-violent tactics, and is therefore chosen when dissidents are few in number. She 
finds that demand for independence, political exclusion and economic discrimination have effect 
on both violent and non-violent strategies. While democracy and state capacity measured in 
GDPPC, relative group size, group concentration and kin in adjoining state have different effects 
on civil war and non-violent champagnes (Cunningham 2013:301). On the basis of this she 
argues that civil war and non-violent strategies should not be considered as entirely separate 
phenomenon, as they are affected by some of the same variables (Cunningham 2013: 302).  
 
 
 
2.4.1 Separating Regime from Regime Stability and State Capacity. 
 
Another area where conflict research has moved towards increased disaggregation is 
operationalization of regime. Particularly there has been an effort towards separating the regime 
type from regime consolidation, stability and capacity. As Hegre et al (2001) note this is an 
important distinction, as anocracies may be more prone to conflict also because they on average 
have gone through transitions more recently.  
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Cederman et al (2010a) are critical of regime being operationalized as a static variable, and 
employ an algorithm that can locate periods of regime change in the polity data to assess the link 
between democratization in addition to regime on conflict. They find that democratization, and to 
a lesser degree autocratization, is associated with civil war. This relationship is also distinct from 
the curvilinear relationship between current regime and civil war, but is only present in the case 
of governmental conflicts (Cederman et al 2010a). Later Cederman et al (2013) add to this by 
examining the relationship of competitive vs non-competitive elections and civil war. Their 
argument is that elections should be associated with conflict in unconsolidated democracies 
because elites have to mobilize voters and this is most easily done on the basis of preexisting 
lines of division and conflict in society. Also there is a risk that the looser of an election will not 
except the defeat and seek violent means to power after the election (Cederman et al (2013). The 
find that elections are associated with conflict, mainly in relation to ethnic violence. 
 
However previous research on the relationship between regime instability and civil war by Hegre 
et al (2009:188) shows that the inverted u-curve of regime and civil war holds even when testing 
for regime instability. Though the results in this analysis are not entirely robust concerning onset, 
and much of the effect of democracy seems to be somewhat linked to wealth and stable 
institutions. 
 
In a previous investigation of the effect of institutional inconsistency and political instability 
Strand et al (2006) using Gurr’s (1970) polity data set to examine changes in institutions. They 
found that institutional inconsistency had a large effect on political stability, and claim that semi-
democracies do not only experience more civil war as a result of being prone to invoke 
grievances, but also because of weak institutional capacity to respond to dissent (Strand et al 
2006: 907). 
 
Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010) argue that using regime variables as proxies for political 
opportunity is problematic, and attempt to create different measurements of opportunity. They 
use data on leader entry as a measure of political opportunity. Their argument is that irregular 
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leader entry is a sign of institutional inconsistency and a good proxy for political opportunity.  
They show that there are (in their data) far more episodes of irregular leader entry than there are 
episodes of change in polity score. This shows that polity works poorly as an indicator of 
institutional instability because a country may have unstable institutions without changing 
regime characteristics (Gleditsch & Ruggeri 2010). They find that irregular leader entry is 
associated with civil war, they also find that the effect of democracy on civil war is negative 
when political opportunity is accounted for (Gleditsch & Ruggeri 2010). 
 
Theis (2010: 325) adopts a more economical measurement of state capacity where he calculates 
complex indicators of the size of the government in the economy as well as the relative capacity 
of that government, compared to governments with similar economic development and resource 
endowment, in terms of tax collection. He finds that state capacity has no effect on civil war 
onset, and neither does primer y product export (Theis 2010: 321, 327-8).  
  
In view of these articles, it seems clear that if one is to isolate the effect of regime on political 
conflict one must account for the effect of institutional stability and governmental capacity. 
However, in what manner state capacity is to be operationalized is a question that still need 
answering in the literature. 
 
 
 
2.4.2 Disaggregating The Spatial Dimension.  
 
A final area where there has been considerable efforts to disaggregate variables is in the spatial 
dimension. The importance of geography in explaining civil war has been acknowledged for 
some time. Several articles of importance have used measures of difficult terrain as an indicator 
for civil war and especially guerrilla tactics opportunity (Collier & Hoeffler 2004, Fearon & 
Laitin 2003).  However, the spatial scope of most conflict studies have either used country year 
data (the monadic level) or focused on a single case. This is not the best way to analyse internal 
conflicts as many of them involve only a small part of a given country (Buhaug & Gates 2002). 
Disaggregating the spatial dimention of conflict therefore means to analyse conflict on a sub-
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national level, and providing data on ethnic groups, economic realities and other variables know 
to explain conflict at that level (Buhaug & Gates 2002, Buhaug & Lujala 2005, Buhaug 2010).   
  
 
2.5 Other Notable Findings 
 
 
A large number of variables have been found to correlate with one conflict type or other. There is 
no need to review them all here, as not all of them are significant for many types of conflict, nor 
is there space for it. However, there are some that need to be mentioned. 
 
Ethnicity was long thought to be one of the top, if not the, explaining variable of civil war. With 
the breaking up of old European empires into countries whose boarders were either drawn by 
ruler, or even worse, deliberately set to dived the population in order to keep them from uniting 
against the colonial power. Moreover, with the collapse of The Soviet Union in the early 90s, 
ethnicity became a central part of many intrastate conflicts in the late 20th and early 21th century 
(Gurr 2000). The body of work on ethnicity is massive and there is only space to review the most 
relevant articles here. As for other types of diversity, such as religious diversity Dixon (2009: 
710) notes societies are split along many such lines, but little consensus exists on how they ought 
to be operationalized.    
  
The Minorities at risk project (MAR) is probably the most extensive work done on ethnicity and 
political conflict. It is a vast project that collects information on, and analyzes ethnic minorities 
who are politically active (Minorities at Risk 2014). As well as a number of publications, the 
main product of the project is the MAR dataset, which covers 283 groups form 1945 – present 
(Minorities at Risk 2014).     
Ellingsen (2000) reviews previous work on ethnicity as well as other variables that affects civil 
war, and conducts an analysis of it. Ellingsen (2000:244) finds that multiethnicity is associated 
with conflict, but does not find support that the size of the minority has impact on conflict onset.   
Fearon and Laitin (2003) later conduct one of the most famous investigations into the 
relationship of ethnicity and civil war. They argue that grievances are too common to explain 
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variations in civil conflict between nations (Fearon & Laitin 2003: 3). They rather adopt an 
opportunity approach to political conflict where they seek to analyses, as they say, the feasibility 
of insurgency. Weak governments, they argue, is what mainly improve the feasibility of 
insurgency. They find that ethnic fractionalization, measured by linguistic differences, has at best 
a marginal effect on civil war (Fearon & Laitin 2003: 3, 16).    
   
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) whom have been mention before concerning state capacity conduct a 
similar analysis. They find very weak if any effects from their diversity variables (Collier & 
Hoeffler 2003:587-9). 
   
Finally Cederman et al (2010b) create a dataset that takes into account the power relations 
between various ethnic groups in societies. Rather than measuring total fractionalization in 
populations this dataset gives information on the relative size of politically powerful and 
excluded ethnicities. They conduct an analysis of this data and civil war, and find that if large 
ethnic groups are excluded or if there is intense competition between groups in power, this is 
strongly associated with internal conflict (Cederman et al 2010b).   
 
There is academic consensus that population size affects conflict positively, that is that countries 
with larger populations have more conflicts (Dixon 2009). However, it is not entirely clear how 
population affects conflict. It could be an indicator of opportunity as well as grievances; on the 
opportunity side a larger population could mean a larger recruitment basis for rebels, it could 
mean larger administrative challenges and thereby a weaker state (Enia et al 2011: 2636-7). As a 
grievance factor, a larger population could mean a larger degree of ethnic fractionalization. It 
could also mean an on average lager number of other divisions in society along, religious, class 
or ideological boundaries. Which of these explanations is correct is still in debate, but there is no 
doubt that population size is correlated with conflict.   
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2.6 General Theoretical Explanations of Internal Conflict 
 
 
In the previous section, I looked at the research that inspired this thesis and some trends in recent 
conflict research. In this section, I will explore the two major theoretical explanations that seek 
to be applicable to all kinds of political conflict in the hope of generating hypothesis that can be 
applied to all conflict types analyzed here.  
 
There have been theories of the characteristic of various political regimes and the nature of 
political conflicts for as long as there have been political regimes and political conflicts. The 
ancient Greek philosophers were the first to make a systematic analysis of various political 
regimes. Aristotle [Unknown] (1996) made the first classification system of political regimes. In 
this system regimes were classified by two criteria how many ruled and whether the regime was 
beneficial for the population at large or only for the rulers. In this system there where two kinds 
of public regimes the benign one was called polity and corrupted one democracy. The point 
being that at this time democracy was thought of as an unstable and conflict prone form of 
government. Aristotle and Plato both were concerned with the quality of leadership and the 
danger of despotic populists rising to power in a democracy (Aristotle [Unknown] 1996, Plato 
[Approx. 308bc] 2001). 
 
The point is that the modern conception of democracy as a particularly peaceful form of 
government is quite new, and was developed through the reformation and Renascence, where 
particularly new interpretations of roman text on republican government along with the increased 
individualism of protestant Christianity. Through the enlightenment period these processes 
inspire and drive the development of liberal thinking which eventually end up in modern liberal 
democracy as we now know it. Machiavelli is the first theorist to view the internal conflicts of 
republican regimes as a source of strength (Machiavelli [1531] 1950). He belied that with the 
right political institutions such conflicts could be resolved peacefully before they were allowed 
to escalate, the energy that would normally be expended on these conflicts could then be put to 
advancement of the common good (Machiavelli [1531] 1950). Tocqueville ([1835] 2006) is the 
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first political thinker to take note of the importance of social moments and the differences that 
exist in them from state to state. In his analysis of democracy in America he makes the 
observation that social movement were far more common in America than in France and far 
more rarely ended in violence there (Tocqueville [1835] 2001, McAddam et al 1996: 45). In later 
times, and especially after World War 2 the amount of work done on internal conflict has 
skyrocketed. Reviewing all of it is both impossible within the bounds of this paper and 
unnecessary, this paper will therefore focus on the two main prevailing theories in the field, the 
theory of relative deprivation and the theory of political opportunity. 
 
2.6.1 Relative Deprivation Theory 
 
A staggering amount of work has been done to try to scientifically explain political conflict. 
Much of this work culminated in the relative deprivation theory of political conflict in the 1970s. 
This theory states that political conflict is a result of a discrepancy between what people have, 
both in materialistic as well as idealistic ways, and what they believe they are entitled to. Ted R. 
Gurrs book Why Men Rebel (1970) puts it like this: 
 
“(RD) is defined as actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. 
Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value 
capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping. (Gurr 1970: 24)” 
 
In this book Gurr (1970) builds this theory of relative deprivation and explores many assets of 
value capabilities, and under what conditions discrepancy between value capabilities and value 
expectations may lead to relative deprivation. First, I will review this theory’s general 
explanation of political conflict, and then I will turn to its view on the role of regime in political 
conflicts. 
 
The theory of relative deprivation builds on physiological theories of aggression as well as 
classical and modern theories of revolution. Gurr (1970) reviews work done up to that point in 
time and attempts to create a unified theory based on it. The core causality in relative deprivation 
theory is elegantly and intuitively simple, frustration leads to aggression. Particularly frustrations 
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that cannot be avoided or escaped lead to aggression against its source, in political circumstances 
such frustration is a result of extreme relative deprivation (Gurr [1970] 2011: 36)1. Gurr ([1970] 
2011) goes on to deal with relative deprivation in detail. He makes the quite illustrative 
distinction between deprivation and disappointment, where the point is that disappointment is the 
result of unrealized aspirations while deprivation is the result of unrealized expectations. 
Therefore deprivation is much more likely to result in aggression precisely because it derives 
from expectations, things one takes for granted. 
 
Gurr ([1970] 2011: 46) then considers how relative deprivation relates to a changing political and 
social world. He introduces a typology of three different situations that induce relative 
deprivation, all of which relate to the idea that people adjust their value expectations to meet 
their value capabilities. The first is 'decremental deprivation' where expectations are stable but 
capabilities decline. The second is 'aspirational deprivation’ where the capabilities are stable but 
the expectations increase. Finally, there is 'progressive deprivation' where the expectations rise 
and the capabilities decline (Gurr [1970] 2011: 46). Progressive deprivation is probably the most 
severe type. The idea was introduced by Davies (1962) as the J-Curve hypothesis, and is 
common in societies that see steady improvements followed by a rapid decline. In such a society 
people begin to expect further improvements and thereby become progressively deprived when 
society regresses (Gurr [1970] 2011: 52). Relative deprivation is then the source of political 
conflict for Gurr ([1970] 2011), both the type and severity of political conflict can be explains by 
analyzing the sources of relative deprivation. 
        
In regard to regime Gurr (1970) strongly emphasizes the importance of legitimacy relative to 
peoples value expectations. His theory is centered around explaining the motivations of 
dissidents in order to explain the occurrence of political conflict. This paper will later deal with 
theories that consider the impact regime has on the actual opportunity to rebel regardless of 
motivation, for now it is enough to note that RD only depicts one side of the coin of political 
conflict. Legitimacy for Gurr points to by which degree the people of a state feel that their 
regime is proper and deserving of support (Gurr 1970: 185). The argument is that people will 
                                                 
1 1 This is also Why Men Rebel, but a different edition. I cite them differently in case the page numbers are not the 
same. 
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become frustrated and take action if a regime does something that is considered outside their 
authority. Additionally people will typically direct this frustration first against the incumbents of 
the regime, then the institutions and finally the regime itself (Gurr 1970: 186). This is because 
people may be fine with institutional ways in which policy is created, even if they don't agree 
with the specific policy. Additionally people have “participatory values” I.e. an understanding of 
in what manner and to what degree they ought to be able to participate in society and politics. If 
regimes do not deliver on these expectations people we resort to increasingly, drastic measures to 
see those values are met. 
 
Gurr (1970) also notes that in the current day (1970) the idea of legitimacy is tied to consent, 
where authoritarian regimes who maintain stability only through coercion immediately become 
unstable if the coercion stops. Gurr (1970:232) expands on the theme of coercion, introducing a 
concept of 'coercive balance'. Coercive balance is a concept that recognizes that the coercive 
capabilities of either a government or dissidents is meaningful only so far as it is considered in 
relation to that of its opponent. This observation is interesting as Gurr’s (1970) theory is 
primarily interested in the motivations or grievances of dissidents and not the government in 
explaining dissidence. However here Gurr (1970) touches on 'the other side of the coin' where 
the capability or opportunity to dissent is considered.  What is more Gurr ([1970]2011:235) 
touches on what is the conclusion of Buahaug (2006) and the inspiration of this paper, that the 
type as well as the intensity of political violence depends on the balance of coercive capabilities 
between regime and dissidents. Gurr ([1970] 2011) then makes a few hypothesis concerning a 
small typology of political conflict. He hypothesizes that when dissidents are relatively weak 
small-scale violence is likely, such as terrorism or coups d’état. If balance is approximately equal 
then civil war is likely, and if either side is relatively strong conspiracies are likely.   
   
In addition to the coercive balance, Gurr (1970) also speaks of an 'institutional balance. 
Institutional balance refers to the idea that the side who can offer institutional ways for people to 
achieve their value expectations gains legitimacy. In terms of a regime, this means offering 
institutional ways for people to achieve their material as well as ideological values. In a 
democracy, the main way dissent is avoided is by supplying legal and viable ways for people to 
achieve their ideological and participation values, while autocracies rely on coercion. Gurr 
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([1970] 2011) deals with the mechanism behind this in detail when he examines what decides the 
intensity and scope of relative deprivation. Amongst other things, the amount of opportunities 
that an actor has determines the scope and intensity of relative deprivation. Concerning regime it 
is mainly a matter of political opportunities, while other opportunities such as economical or 
even personal could be affected by regime as well. The purpose of democracy here is to provide 
legal, peaceful and viable political opportunities in order to alleviate or prohibit relative 
deprivation, while autocracies use repression in order to discourage people from acting on their 
deprivation. Similarly, dissidents can also gain legitimacy and support by offering institutions 
that a regime fail to provide. As an example this was done by The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
during the Mubarak regime, where they provided welfare goods such as schools, medical 
attention, and clothes where the regime failed to do so, and thus gained legitimacy with the 
population (Walsh 2003). 
 
 
 
2.6.3 Political Opportunity Theory. 
 
Also known as, 'political process theory' this theory tries to explain political conflicts by 
investigating the political structure and process of a given political unit to account for what kind 
of opportunity it gives to dissidents. The core argument being that actors will always choose the 
path of the least resistance, as political dissidence is not seen as something that has a value in it 
shelf, but as something that is done only as a means to an end. In relation to relative deprivation 
theory, political opportunity theory concerns itself not with the motivation of dissidents but with 
what opportunity there is for rebellion regardless. The tradition bears strong ties and similarities 
with rational choice theory (Enia et al 2010).   
 
McAddam et al (1996) review the literature that existed in this field up until then, and attempts to 
create a foundation for a unified political opportunity theory. For this purpose, they single out 
three main aspects of the theory. 
 
The opportunity structure is the sum of all factors that influences the opportunity to dissent, 
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considered as a unified system (McAdam et al 1996). There are a large number of factors in any 
such structure and the factors could vary from country to country. However, in most cases such 
things as the nature of the constitution, the legal system, political institutions and the balance of 
power between dissidents and incumbents will have a large impact on the opportunity to dissent. 
 
Mobilization Structures account for the ability of dissidents to organize, as well as the general 
ability to cooperate in a society. The opportunity for dissent is considered greater in societies that 
have a culture that emphasizes cooperation and where people are experienced at organizing 
themselves. The logic is quite simply that in order to have any kind of dissension you have to be 
able to organize it. Extending this logic, what degree of organization a group is capable of may 
influence what sort of dissension they choose (Tilly 1978, McAdam et al 1996). The ability and 
freedom to organize is something that is best assessed qualitatively as it is a quite complex 
phenomenon. However, it seems reasonable that those features of dissidents should be more 
prominent in consolidated democratic regimes, as democracies encourage cooperation and 
allows freedom of organization. 
 
Framing refers to the physiological idea of cognitive frames. Frames can be thought of as 
bridging the gap between what one should expect from political opportunity theory and what one 
can actually observe in the real world. Frames identify the perception actors have of their 
political opportunity structure. Because even though there may be a good opportunity for dissent 
this may not be clear to actors and they may also overestimate their chances and try dissent in a 
hopeless situations (McAdam et al 1996). In other words it accounts for actors not having perfect 
information.  
 
Tarrow (1996) then goes on, in a sub chapter of McAdam et al (1996), to consider what 
opportunity structures can be discerned at the state level. The relationship he describes is 
curvilinear, where larger political opportunity is not associated with more, or with more violent 
protest, but where a mix of restriction and opportunity is associated with both. At the same time 
either extreme opportunity, or extreme lack thereof, is associated with less protest. This makes 
sense in light of the finding that mixed regimes are most associated with dissidence. 
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Like Gurr (1970) McAdam et al (1996) see legitimacy as key in regard to regimes. As Oberschall 
(1996) puts it: “lack of regime legitimacy is an opportunity for opponents (Oberschall 1996: 
95).” In Gurrs (1970) theory regime affected relative deprivation. In political opportunity theory 
regime is a central part of the political structure that determines what types of political 
engagement that is possible and, opportune. The point of democracies providing legal peaceful 
and viable forms of political engagement is not here to alleviate relative deprivation, but to make 
the relative cost of other, potentially violent forms of engagement higher. Authoritarian regimes 
by comparison use repression in a larger degree to make the cost of any kind of unwanted 
political engagement high. A good example of this theory is an analysis of transitions form 
authoritarian regimes to democracies done by Linz & Stepan (1996). In their model the type of 
regime is critical in determining what manner of transitions may take place, as different regimes 
open different opportunities for the opposition. In other words the opportunity structure 
determines the most likely form of political activity, because actors evaluate political activities 
on a cost benefit basis, and regime is a central part of that structure.     
 
Using the fall of The Soviet Union as an example Oberschall (1996) goes on to make a classic 
point that was also mentioned by Gurr (1970), about authoritarian regimes and dissidence. That 
an authoritarian regime that begins to open up more opportunities for political participation will 
quickly erode their authority, and frequently suffer rapid collapses. If dissidents can frame the 
situation in such a way that the regime seems immoral or illegitimate then they can erode its 
authority, and contrary if the regime can frame the dissidents as terrorists, criminals or similar, 
they erode the authority and legitimacy of the dissidents.  
 
 
2.6.4 The Greed Grievance Debate. 
 
In the introduction to the fortieth anniversary edition of Why Men Rebel Gurr ([1970] 2011) takes 
the opportunity to assess the applicability of his theory of rebellion in the current world. He 
makes several points about where Why Men Rebel is inadequate today as well as some comments 
that are relevant to the greed versus grievances debate; I will focus on these here, as not all his 
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comments are relevant to the paper. First he maintains that understanding peoples grievances is 
still the first step to understanding political conflict, and it is not enough to use political or 
economic structures as explanations, but one must understand how people view them (Gurr 
[1970] 2011: X). However, he concedes Tillys (1978) view that mobilization structures are also 
important in understanding political conflict, and calls for a synthesis between his and Tillys 
(1978) models. He later makes a point that the assumption that was made in Why Men Rebel that 
people who react to relative deprivation act irrationally was a mistake (Gurr  [1970] 2011: XII). 
This does not mean that he thinks that the rational choice theory is right either, rather he 
expresses that neither of the theories are correct, as the both assume too much about rationality a 
priori. Finally, Gurr ([1970] 2011) makes a point about the role of the state in analysis of 
political conflict, where he responds to critique that his theory does not adequately account for 
the state. First, he claims that the state is part of his theory, in that it can contribute to grievances, 
and holds that legitimacy is a verified explanation for political conflict. However, he allows that 
the question of why some governments use repression while others do was not answered in Why 
Men Rebel (Gurr [1970] 2011: XIII).      
 
Much of the most recent research on civil war builds on work done by Collier & Hoeffler (1998, 
2004). They argue for what is known as the supply side of civil war where the idea is that civil 
wars occur where there is an opportunity for them to be successful (supply), as there is always 
some miss-contented group or other in any society (demand) (Collier et al 2003). In other words 
there is always demand for civil war but not always supply, and thus it is the supply side of 
conflict onset that is decisive in which countries have civil wars and not. According to political 
opportunity theory, the same logic should also apply to non-violent conflicts, but with different 
patterns. They separated opportunity theory and relative deprivation theory into the dichotomy of 
greed versus grievances, and started a debate about which of these theories best explained civil 
war. 
Collier et al (2003) examine what has been done of research up until that point and conclude that 
neither greed nor grievances can explain civil war onset alone, however every society has 
grievances while civil war is relatively rare (Collier et al 2003: 89). Therefore predicting civil 
war is very difficult.  In order for a conflict over some grievance to become violent there need be 
economical incentive, and a weak or illegitimate enough government for violence to be a viable 
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political means. Collier et al (2003) consider economic development to be the factor that best 
explains civil war onset, as this correlates with conflict regardless of other factors. Looking back 
at the above-mentioned theory of political opportunity and of relative deprivation it seems that it 
is opportunity that decides which conflicts become violent. As Collier et al (2003) put it: “[...] no 
military and financially viable [emphasis added] opportunity to promote a political agenda by 
rebellion will be missed (Collier et al 2003:89).”  
 
                       
Enia et al (2010: 2632) wrote a review article summarizing findings in the debate. They claim 
that the grievances theory lacks empirical support. They do however emphasize that some very 
recent studies show limited support for the theory, and that it is solid and intuitive on the abstract 
plane, despite lack of empirical support. As for the theory of political opportunity, Enia et al 
(2010) claim that there is more empirical support for this theory. In particular, they point out that 
economic development and population size has been shown to be very strongly associated with 
civil war. Enia et al (2010) then go on to criticize the current theoretical dichotomy in the field. 
Their main criticism is that the dichotomy is neither mutually exclusive nor useful as an 
analytical tool. The criticism that is leveled at both theories is that they lack an understanding of 
the causal mechanism that leads from either the presence of grievances or opportunities to actual 
dissent. There are lots of countries that have grievances that don't experience dissent, similarly 
there are lots of countries where there are great opportunities for dissent that is never acted on. 
Towards the grievances theory specifically they claim that it fails to account for any other 
motivations. Then they claim that attributing indicators like GDP, population, state capacity and 
regime entirely to either opportunities or grievances is less than ideal (Enia et al 2010). The 
reasoning they give for this is that several of these variables could be catching effects of both 
theories.  One of the examples that they give of this is that lack of economic development can 
both be a source of opportunity through decreasing the cost of dissidence relative to inaction, and 
a course of relative deprivation compared to better times or other people. Additionally the two 
theories may explain the same conflict at different times, for example, a grievance-based conflict 
founded by diamonds may evolve to become mainly economically motivated as more and more 
economically motivated people join the rebels. Finally, it is a problem of both theories that they 
don't adequately account for the role of the state but focus mainly on the opportunities or 
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grievances of dissidents.   
 
If Enia et al (2010) are right about this then it is a major problem. Their solution to how it can be 
solved is that the two theories must both be considered as mutually necessary in order to explain 
dissidence. They also argue that the specter of grievances ought to be opened up in an attempt to 
account for other motivations for dissent. To this end they champion the idea of using the term 
willingness, which is meant to encompass all sorts of motivation rather than only grievances.   
 
 
In summary conflict can be explained in terms of both frustration (grievances) and opportunity 
(greed). As frustration is constant one looks for opportunity in order to explain conflict onset. 
However if one wishes to understand a specific conflict one must understand the frustration it is 
based on. It seems to me that the opportunity approach is most helpful in a statistical 
investigation, as representing grievances a way that makes sense statistically is very difficult. 
Particularly if one wants to represent the individual grievances and histories behind every 
conflict, it becomes impossible to represent in a data matrix. Statistical analysis must rely on 
some amount of generalization in order to uncover general patterns. However, for case studies 
seeking to identify specific casual mechanisms, trying to understand people and their grievances 
seems central. If these two approaches can supplement each other perhaps they can form a 
cohesive and generally accepted theory of political conflict.  
 
The relationship of regime and conflict is not entirely understood, and there is much discussion 
in the field on whether it has a separate effect or if it is better explains as a co variant with 
economic development and/or state capacity and stability. It seems to me that it is possible that 
effects found from regime in early statistical studies such as Hegre et al (2001) could in fact be 
cashing the effect of other variables because of the methodological problems involved in 
measuring regime and conflict respectively. As Gleditsch et al (2014) calls it, the increasing 
disaggregation of variables in peace research may help uncover the actual correlations. It seems 
quite unlikely to me that the form of regime, that is the way in which politics are conducted in a 
country, should have no impact on the forms of conflict found in that country independently of 
other factors. That it not to say that they do not affect each other, they probably do, but I would 
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argue that to rule out regime entirely seems counter intuitive. From a perspective of opportunity 
regime is central in explaining both what forms of dissidence that is available to actors and 
which of them ought to be successful. In terms of grievances regime ought to have some effect as 
different regimes deal with internal grievances in different ways, as well as through the effect of 
people comparing their political value capabilities to those of others thus creating deprivation 
relative to that group if their capabilities are lower.       
 
 
2.7 Hypothesis 
 
In relation to regime and conflict, what relationships are to be expected? A challenge for this 
paper is to create unified set of hypothesis based on research done on separate conflict types. As 
seen in the research section much of the work done in conflict studies naturally focuses on a 
single type of conflict.  In order to attempt to create hypothesis about the relationship between 
regime and several types of conflict I looked at that try to explain political conflict in general 
(grievance and opportunity). Inherently this means that this paper simplifies the relationship, the 
effect of regime on each of this conflict types could easily be an entire paper, but the point is to 
use new data to facilitate a unified analysis of several conflict types, therefore a unified set of 
hypothesis is also required.  
 
If all of the empirical evidence I considered it seems to me that there is a relationship between 
regime and conflict, as the majority of studies do find some relationship, even thou it is not 
entirely robust across different studies. However it seems that it is not entirely clear what the 
statistical relationship and the causal mechanisms that link regime type and regime consolidation 
and stability to each other is, and how much of conflict variation that can be explained by either. 
 
In any case, it seems to me that protest actions ought to be associated with democracy. This 
because democracies repress small-scale violent dissent to a smaller degree than authoritarian 
regimes, and completely allow non-violent protest actions. Therefore, the opportunity for this 
sort of dissent is greater in democracies, and I will expect that: H1: Democracy will have a 
positive effect on non-violent protests. 
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Empirical evidence seems to tend towards severe internal conflicts being less common in 
democracies than other regimes, although there is some disagreement about whether, or to what 
degree, this is explained by stability or economic development rather than regime. As for theory; 
the idea of democracy as a peaceful means of conflict resolution seems to have a lot of support. 
Therefore I expect that: H2: Democracy should affect more severe forms of political conflict 
negatively. 
 
The opening up of participation combined with repression should help to both create 
opportunities for dissidents and fuel grievances toward the regime. Therefore I will expect that: 
H3: Autocracies should see more of any kind of conflict. 
 
 
The shear amount of repression in consolidated authoritarian regimes should restrict opportunity 
for any kind of participation. While some have found slightly higher correlations between 
authoritarian regimes and civil war than democracies there is in theory nothing that indicates that 
they should have more forms of violent conflict than democracy. As for non-violent conflict 
everything indicates that these ought to be far more common in democracies and authoritarian 
regimes. H4: Authoritarian regimes should impact all forms of conflict negatively.   
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3.0 Data and Methodology 
 
 
In this section, I will discuss the data I have chosen to use in my analysis and how I use these to 
operationalize the various variables, the methodology of the analysis itself, and methodological 
problems involved with both. 
 
The section will begin with discussing why a quantitative method was chosen, the advantages 
and challenges of this method. Then I will consider the data, first concerning the dependent 
variable and then concerning regime, then control variables, and finally move on to consider the 
analysis itself.  
 
3.1 The Statistical Method 
 
 
The method of this paper will be to conduct a statistical analysis of event counts on a country 
year or monadic/national level (Gleditsch & Hegre 1997). There are several reasons that a 
quantitative research method was chosen. Firstly there are several methodological reasons. 
This paper begins with a theoretical motivated hypothesis about the relationship between regime 
types and conflict types. Based on previous research and theory, discussed above, the paper 
hypothesises that the logic driving the observed difference between various kinds of civil war 
and regime extends to other types of conflict as well. In order to test this hypothesis a statistical 
test is assembled to see if the same relationship can be found for several types of conflict. 
 
There are several advantages to the quantitative statistical approach. The goal of a quantitative 
study is to find general relationships. The most favoured method for doing this is the 
experimental. Experiments involve manipulating data in order to uncover general relationships 
by observing the effects of the manipulations, preferably in a controlled environment where all 
variables that affect the data are accounted for, so that the exact causal relationship is revealed 
(Moses & Knudsen 2007). However this is obviously neither particularly possible nor ethically 
defensible in the social sciences in general, and even more so in conflict studies. When seeking a 
34 
 
general pattern the method of choice in the discipline has therefore been the statistical method. 
The statistical method relies on analysing data on things that have already happened. Statistics 
attempt to infer relationships that cannot be directly observed in the data through analysis. In the 
case of this paper, it will be used to try to infer whether there is a relationship between regime 
and conflict that cannot be directly observed in the data.   
 
Another advantage is that given replication data and exact information of what has been done 
with the data it will be possible for anyone to replicate the results of a study. Which means that 
the method and results of my work can be assessed evaluated directly, rather than being 
dependent on my subjective interpretations. See appendix F for a download link to replication 
data for this study.  
 
Finally, the method is appropriate to the question at hand, as regimes are complex phenomenon 
that are practically speaking difficult to assess quantitatively. Statistical analysis allowed for the 
explorations of several kinds of regimes and several conflict types, while a qualitative project 
would be limited to one or a few cases. 
 
Additionally there are some practical reasons for choosing a quantitative approach. Much of the 
research that has been done in this field previously has been conducted statistically using country 
years, which means that data both on regime and control variables is primarily available in that 
format. Additionally even if a qualitative method had been appropriate for the question at hand, 
gathering primary data of any kind is both resource and time consuming neither of which I have 
much. 
 
On the other hand, there are weaknesses in the method. Qualitative research could identify causal 
mechanisms that related to specific phenomena, i.e. specific regimes or specific conflicts that 
might be missed by a broad sweeping quantitative study. The quantitative method involves a fair 
portion of simplification. For example, the categorization of regime into democracy, anocracy 
and authoritarian regimes does not capture the entire picture of various regimes. Similarly, events 
have to be put into manageable categories, which means that much data is lost (see below for a 
more detailed description of this). In other words, quantitative method runs the risk of failing to 
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see causal relationships particular to individual cases, as caused by all cases in a category. 
Another weakness of the approach is that it assumes that the social world can be understood 
objectively, while the researcher is in fact part of it (Moses & Knudsen 2007: 145).   
 
 
 
3.2 Data on Conflict and Challenges with Event Data. 
 
The data on conflict in this paper is taken form The Global Database of Events, Language and 
Tone (GDELT) which is an automatically coded event dataset made by Kalev Leetaru, Yahoo! 
and The Institute for The Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University(Leetaru  & Schrodt 
2013)2. The introduction of large-scale event data has been seen as a possible big step forward 
for the social sciences, as it makes information on social events more directly available (King 
2011, Gleditsch et al (2014). The use of these kinds of data in conflict research is a new 
phenomenon and a very promising one; however there are also certain challenges to overcome 
that will be discussed here. 
 
Events are simply things that have happened, typical taken from news reports. Simply put, event 
data are lists where each event is written in a sentence that contains codes that give information 
on that event through the use of a code book. The GDELT data then exists as a series of .text 
documents where each line is a separate event. Because there are a large variety of event types in 
GDELT some selection is necessary, I will come back to the exact selection later. 
 
The GDELT data is automatically coded based news reports form a number of sources. Because 
it is automatically coded, it has the simple advantage of other datasets of being very big. The 
total number of events in the dataset at the time of writing is just above 200 million, in the words 
of an unknown genius; 'quantity has a quality all of its own'. The computer analyses news reports 
                                                 
2Apparently Leetaru has been accused of stealing the text sources for GDELT, as far as I can tell, whether he is 
guilty or not, this has no impact on the scientific properties of the data-set 
(http://www.state.il.us/court/R23_Orders/AppellateCourt/2013/4thDistrict/4130290_R23.pdf). 
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and writes the result of its analysis into a line in a text document. This line consists of a number 
of numerical and string variables that list a huge amount of information concerning the event in 
question. This is the basic premise of the data, however there are a number of questions that can 
be asked concerning the methodology of these data; how reliable is the computer interpretation 
of text? What sources are used? How is the data coded? Is there danger of duplicate reports? Etc. 
 
In order to answer these questions we have to explore a couple of five letter acronyms, TABARI 
and CAMEO. Textual Analysis by Augmented Replacement Instructions (TABARI) is the actual 
software that codes the GDELT data from news reports. The inner technical workings of this 
program is highly complex, but the general idea is understandable. TABARI uses pattern 
recognition software to analyse short pieces of text such as headlines and wire services (Schrodt 
2011). Essentially TABARI is a piece of software that is very good at sentence analysis. It looks 
at these short pieces of text and identifies (1) the actor (proper nouns), (2) verbs and (3) phrases 
that explain the meaning of the verbs (Schrodt 2011). However, it is important to note that 
TABARI is only good at this with short simple sentences, and makes mistakes when confronted 
with unusual grammar or complex sentences. This is because it is specifically coded to analyse 
news where the language is usually in the form of X does Y because Z. It is important to note 
though that TABARI is fed only news that is formatted to be readable by it, according to the 
author of the TABARI documentation (Schrodt 2011). The reason for this is that TABARI relies 
on what is called 'sparse-parsing' of sentences, which means it does not do a full analysis of the 
syntax, as some programs can do, but looks only for the three factors mentioned above (Schrodt 
2011). The reasoning behind this is the desire for speed, the slimmer the program the more data 
can be gathered, and the faster the program will be in reanalysing data if the coding rules are 
changed. However there is a 'filter' of sorts in TABARI that separate very complex sentences 
which TABARI then skips, and which is later coded by a human. In addition, it is a problem that 
TABARI looks at sentences with complete disregard for context, so while it is quite clever it 
cannot be analytical like a human. 
 
Furthermore, there is a bias in the data that is probably caused by the internet. There are simply 
far more events after circa the year 2000 when the internet becomes more common. This is due 
to there simply being far more news reports in the years where the internet is common, and that 
37 
 
data for the years before that are coded from archives while the data after the internet is partially 
coded live.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Predicted counts of events for all conflict variables over time. 
 
The figure above illustrates the problem well. It depicts the predicted count for all conflict types 
by year. As year increases the predicted count increases. The data was obtained by running a 
simple count model with year as the only predictor. This model is not meant to serve the analysis 
it merely illustrates the general tendency towards more events later in the data. There could also 
be another reason for this general trend in the data. Populations has, as I mentioned in the theory 
chapter, been found to be a robust predictor of conflict (Hegre & Sambanis 2006). The 
population of the world has increased from 4.5 to 7 billion (US Census Bureau 2014), which 
probably means that the total number of violent events has increased as well.  
 
However, it is not an option to disregard the later data, as some of the most valuable data comes 
from this period. In order to account for this effect a variable was constructed to represent the 
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increase in data as year increases. This variable, let us call it internet bias, is given as: internet 
bias = year – 1979. Where 1979 is the first year in the data and year is the time variable for 
country years. Thus the variable increases in value the newer the data is, if this bias has an effect 
on the analysis time should be significant and positive, because the newer the data the more 
events. Hopefully this variable will isolate some of the effect of this tendency.  
 
A final problem with the data is considered by Quan Li (2005) in an article that examines the 
relationship of regime and terrorism. The problem is that data coded from news reports has a 
general bias towards more events of any kind happening in democracies, more so than should be 
expected from theory.  The reason for this is differences in freedom of press. While democracies 
have full freedom of the press, anocracies and authoritarian regimes do not. Which again means 
there will be more events recorded in democracies than other regimes, not because democracies 
necessarily have more of these events, but because they are more frequently reported on in 
democracies. In other words, differences in freedom of press creates problems with data 
reliability. In addition, there could be similar problems in the bias of various news agencies, who 
are after all businesses and manly interested in whether something sells rather than if it is 
scientifically interesting. GDELT as well as most automatically coded event data tries to address 
this by using many sources, so that as many stories as possible are recorded, and as little of the 
individual news agency bias affects the data as possible. Similarly, press coverage could also be 
correlated with wealth. Poor and undeveloped countries may not have as good press coverage as 
rich countries.  
 
On the other hand, there are several major advantages to machine coding; one is already 
mentioned, it is enormously fast. TABARI writes thousands of sentences every second! Coding 
at this level of magnitude is simply not possible manually. Not to mention that even if TABARI 
had been as slow as, in the words of the documentation author, “[...] legions of bored 
undergraduates (Schrodt 2011: 1)[...]” it would still be massively cheaper. Secondly, TABARI, 
unlike people, does not make mistakes. Critique may be levelled at the rules by which TABARI 
codes, but once those are in place it's consistency within those rules is 100% (Schrodt 2011). In 
addition to the advantage, that there are no coding errors there is neither any coding bias that 
cannot be accounted for by the coding rules, I.e any bias is reproducible. Additionally if the 
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sparse-parshing results in errors, they will be random, while human errors are frequently 
systematic (Schrodt 2011). Problems with random errors can be solved by statistical analysis, 
while systematic errors can be very difficult to correct. What is more if the coding scheme is 
changed and the entire dataset needs recoding, that can be done quite rapidly using computer 
coding. In one such instance they gained access to a computer used for scientific calculations, 
using this, TABARI coded 70'000 sentences a second of a total of 26 million sentences, which 
means that at the same speed all of GDELT could have been recoded in about 47 minutes 
(Schrodt 2011: 119).  
 
Now, with TABRI in mind let us consider what actual codes TABARI writes. The codes written 
by TABARI are part of a system called Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO). 
CAMEO is a system of number and string codes that distinguishes actors verbs and tones, and 
lots of information about them. In this paper, I am looking for specific types of events done by 
specific types of actors. I am looking for non-state actors and politically motivated conflicts. 
CAMEO codes actor type has a three-letter string variable and event-type codes as numeric 
codes following a simple structure of category and sub category. For instance 141 means 
demonstrations generally, 1411 means demonstrations for leadership change, 1412 means the 
same for policy change, there are several of these subcategories and they are typically the same 
for each major category (Schrodt 2011, 2012). In addition, the subcategories are then organized 
so that they increase with severity. 
 
 
Now I will give my reasoning for selecting the actors and event types that I have selected, and 
then show how exactly I extracted the data from GDELT and how it was aggregated and what 
aggregation choices were made and why. To see the exact codes that were selected see the 
appendix A. 
 
For actors all non-state, non-sivilian, actors were selected. The selection of actors is logical, as 
this paper is interested intrastate conflict. It makes sense to exclude governmental actors as 
governmental repression and one-sided violence is not part of this study. No further distinction is 
made between types of actors as this paper is trying to answer what happens in which kinds of 
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regime, not who does what in which kinds of regimes.  
 
For events, however selection was a bit trickier. The main challenge was to deselect event forms 
that were not politically motivated, but of another, usually criminal, character or that were state 
specific. In brief, there are six categories of events in GDELT that have been used in my data, in 
which there are several sub-categories. These are: 
1. Non-Violent Protest (peaceful demonstrations) 
2. Violent Protest (demonstrations that turned violent) 
3. Coerce (arrests, destruction of properties, and the like) 
4. Assault (small scale, typically unprofessional, asymmetrical and mostly unarmed 
fighting, kidnappings torture, assassinations, suicide bombings etc). 
5. Fight (conventional armed violence, typically of a military nature) 
6. Unconventional mass violence (genocide, ethnic clearings and use of WMDs). 
 
The first thing that should be noted about these categories is that verbal conflicts are not 
included. There are many categories in CAMEO as well as observations of this type of conflict in 
GDLET, however they are not the most relevant for intrastate studies, and it is problematic to 
consider many of these events conflicts. Secondly while there is a quad category variable the 
gives a rough impression of the event type in CAMEO, I thought it was too rough and I wanted 
to go into the sub categories to deselect event types that are outside this papers scope. As an 
example, I deselected any variation of the strike variable that did not state a political goal in 
order to avoid polluting the data with strikes over wages etc. In addition, I think that many of the 
categories, and especially the assault category, are composed of very different kinds of events 
and do not necessarily form a logical category. I therefore wanted to extract events at the sub-
category level so that I could create my own categories in STATA later. These categories are: 
 
1. Protests 
2. Violent Protests 
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3. Small Scale Violence 
4. Asymmetric Violence 
5. Military Violence 
6. Mass violence 
 
The categories are ranked like in GDELT. They get progressive more difficult to organize and 
more severe, beginning with protests and ending up with mass violence. 
The protest category contains various protest actions that were non-violent. Mainly selection was 
done on the strike variables as some of these were non-political, but directed towards wages. 
The violent protest category is mostly the same except that the protest were or eventually turned 
violent. 
 
The small-scale violence category is admittedly less consistent. The protest categories naturally 
belong together; this is less the case with the small-scale violence category. It consists of events 
that are more severe than protests, but perhaps less organized and more spontaneous, but more 
intentionally violent. Riots, blockades, and the like belong here. It is distinct from the 
asymmetric and military categories in that it only includes unarmed violence that requires far less 
organization and can be more spontaneous. Some may react to forms of violence such as sexual 
assault is included, as it is not typically politically motivated. However the actor types included 
in this data are. Therefore, even if not every incidence in this category is intended to have 
political consequences they do occur because of political conflicts.  
 
The asymmetric category similarly contain events that are not necessarily governed by the same 
logic. What they have in common is that they are all forms of unconventional armed violence, 
such as bombings and targeting of civilians, in other words it is a category of terrorist tactics. 
The common factor among them is that they are all 'weapons of the weak', they take less 
resources and organization than the military category, but probably have the same goals.  
 
The military category indicates civil war in this dataset as governmental actors are excluded, or 
at least incidents of conventional armed military violence. It covers all forms of conventional 
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armed warfare present in GDELT. Even though some of these like the use of air weapons and 
tanks is quite rare among rebels, there was no theoretical reason to exclude them or put them in 
another category. The data does however not accurately depict civil wars, but rather single 
instances of military violence, which do not necessarily only occur during civil wars.  
 
The mass violence category contains events of massive unconventional violence, that is mass 
murder, ethnic cleansing and use of WMDs. Use of nuclear weapons have been excluded as there 
are (luckily) no events of non-governmental forces using them. 
 
Now, why did I choose event counts on a country year level? Aggregating events to yearly 
counts by country loses a lot of detail on the events. Events that might be vastly different in 
significance are now clustered together simply because they are of the approximately same type. 
In other words, data on the severity of the event and or any symbolic meaning is lost. What is 
more, GDELT can identify the spatial location of events on a sub-national level. Aggregating the 
data on a national level loses potentially valuable data on where events occur. In a review of data 
trends in conflict research Gleditsch et al (2014) note how there has been trend towards 
disaggregating actors, events, strategies and resolution of conflict data. GDELT can potentially 
contribute in all of these categories of disaggregation, but this paper only disaggregates events. 
One place where GDELT could contribute to this in the future is the event categories for protests; 
these have different sub categories that allowed the researcher to distinguish different actor 
motivations. Along with distinctions of different actors, this could help to give a more complete 
picture of who participate in what manner of protest. However, the same is not true for the 
violent event categories, which is why this has not been attempted here.    
 
I would however argue that the aggregation choices made here are sensible for a number of 
reasons. As Gleditsch et al (2014) stress, data aggregation choices must be made with the 
research question in mind. The country level is appropriate for the question at hand. Regimes are 
characteristics of countries and therefore analysing countries makes sense. Furthermore, because 
the vast majority of conflict research done before was done on a country year level, data on 
independent variables are frequently presented in that format which means it is practical to 
operate at this level, and makes it easier to put the results of this study into the context of 
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previous research.   
 
      
The dataset I end up using was created with the aid of two Python scripts. For those not familiar 
with computer programming Python is an object oriented programming language3. The reason it 
was used is that it focuses on script readability, and has a straightforward logic to its syntax, 
which means it is relatively easy to learn. The first script simply extracts any sentence from the 
GDELT document if any of the chosen event-codes are present and the 'actor1typecode1' is of the 
chosen ones, that is, non-governmental. The second script creates a matrix in the random access 
memory (RAM) where it sorts the events by country year and lists the number of events in that 
country year. It then writes this into a tab delimitated text document that can be imported into 
statistics software. See appendix B for the complete scripts. 
 
3.3 Sample 
 
The data covers the years from 1980 to 2011 in 167 countries. There are 6493 potential 
observations taken from the GDELT data where  4697 are included in the analysis. The reason 
why these are different is that GDELT and the data on independent variables do not always cover 
the same countries or years and STATA automatically excludes and observations that do not 
contain data on both the independent and dependent variables. For a complete list of countries, 
see appendix C.   
 
 
3.4 Data on Independent Variables 
 
3.4.1 Regime 
 
 
                                                 
3Interested reader may want to know that GDELT has later published a tutorial on using Python with GDELT: 
http://nbviewer.ipython.org/urls/raw.githubusercontent.com/JamesPHoughton/Published_Blog_Scripts/master/G
DELT%20Wrangler%20-%20Clean.ipynb  and an online resource for extracting data from GDELT: 
http://analysis.gdeltproject.org/module-event-exporter.html 
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There are several sources of data on regime; Polity IV (Marshall, , & Jaggers, 2013), Freedom 
House (2013) and Vanhanen (2003). In this paper I have chosen to use Polity IV for three simple 
reasons; (1) they focus on institutional characteristic and seem less ideological than Freedom 
Houses rating, (2) they are based on more aspects of society than Vanhanen (2003) which is 
based solely on votes, and (3) it has good coverage and is available in a very easily access 
format. However, there is a major problem with the data that needs to be addressed briefly. 
Vreeland (2008) points out that two of the variables of that data, PARAREG and PARACOMP 
reference political violence between factions, which means that political conflict is endogenous 
to the Polity IV variable. This means that using the raw Polity IV data in an analysis of internal 
conflict could simply show that internal conflict is associated with internal conflict (Vreeland 
2008).  
 
Because of this problem I use Vreelands (2008) proposed x-polity index which is simply the 
Polity IV index minus the PARAREG and PARACOMP variables. I updated this index using the 
Polity IV data as the data provided by Vreeland only reaches to 2004. Unlike the original Polity 
index xpolity spans from -6 (most autocratic) to 7 (most democratic). Another reason that Polity 
IV is used instead of any alternatives is that Vreeland (2008) found similar problems with the 
other alternatives, but only Polity IV supplies the component data for their index, which means 
that the index can be reconstructed without the problematic components. In the analysis, the 
polity scale was recoded into the same dummy variables used by Vreeland (2008). Where 
democracy equals a score of 4 or higher on the xpolity scale, anocracy equals a score between -2 
and 3, and authoritarian regimes equal a score of -3 or smaller.  
 
 The biggest problem with choosing independent variable data is to choose what variables need 
to be accounted for in addition to the primary bivariate relationship between regime and conflict. 
Any study of this kind walks a line between either excluding an important variable or including 
unnecessary variables. Schrodt (2014) writes a review article where he points out the most 
common methodological errors done in conflict research, where he emphasises the problem of 
having to many, and often correlated independent variables. Additionally another usual mistake 
is to use a dataset that has been analysed many times before. At least in this category this paper 
attempts to improve as quite few studies have used GDELT previously. In this study I use a 
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relatively small amount of control variables. The reasoning behind this is both that I want to 
avoid adding unnecessary variables and that I need controls that are relevant for a large number 
of conflicts and have been recently updated.  
 
 
3.4.2 Wealth & Population 
 
 
Wealth has been found to be one of the most important variables in explain conflict (Hegre and 
Sambanis 2006, Dixon 2009). This paper uses the updated v6.0 data on GDP from Gleditsch 
(2002). There aren’t many problems to consider with this data GDP and GDP per capita are well 
known indicators of wealth and their problems are equally well know. The main problem is 
underreporting or miss reporting from various governments. As for the dataset itself, it is well 
referenced, the only problem being that the edition that is extended to 2011 is a beta version; 
however, both GDP and population are apparently complete. GDPPC is given as year 2000 $US.  
 
 
3.4.3 State Capacity & State Stability 
 
 
As was shown in the theory chapter state capacity, state stability and regime are variables where 
the exact mechanisms of how they affect conflict and how they affect each other’s effect on 
conflict is not fully understood. It therefore seems reasonable that in order to isolate the effect of 
regime alone, it is necessary to account for the effect of stability and capacity. State capacity is a 
variable were there are few good data sources, as it is quite difficult to operationalize. Strand et 
al (2006) conduct an analysis of a database of irregular leader entry. They find that it is 
associated with civil war and that there are far more instances of irregular leader entry than of 
polity score change in the polity dataset and therefore conclude that polity is a poor indicator of 
stability. However, this dataset only reaches to 2000, which is a big reason against using it in this 
paper. 
 
Hendrix (2010) reviews the various measures of state capacity that has been used in conflict 
research. The various approaches focus on military capacity, bureaucratic capacity, tax extractive 
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ability or quality of institutions. Hendrix makes a series of valid points regarding the validity and 
the ability of various measures to distinguish between different causal mechanisms. However, an 
overarching problem with the various data is that it does not have sufficient coverage for the 
purpose of this paper. The best possibility were GDP, relative political extraction and Polity 
squared. Among these I first favoured political extraction as it provides a theoretically sound and 
tangible measure of state capacity, the difference between actual tax extracted and theoretically 
possible tax extracted. However, the dataset provided Kruger & Tammen (2012, 2013) has 
serious problems with missing values and sub optimal country coding. Second polity squared is 
simply the Polity index squared, which gives a new variable ranging from 0 to 100 where, rather 
than the for of regime, the higher the score the more consistent the regime (Hendrix 2010). 
Similarly do to the problems with the Polity index discussed above Vreeland (2008) composed a 
similar scale disregarding the problematic variables in the Polity index. However, I am 
concerned that Polity squared is too similar to my regime variable which involves a risk of 
multicollinearity. Therefore, GDP remains the best possible measure of state capacity for this 
paper. In addition to being readily, available GDP has the advantage of being highly correlated 
with several measures of bureaucratic capacity (Hendrix 2010: 277). There are however several 
problems with this that the reader should be aware of when viewing the results of the analysis. 
First of all GDP can be both a cause and an effect of bureaucratic excellence. Secondly, it relates 
to conflict also as a measure of economic development, not just administrative capacity. 
Specifically GDP is considered by many to affect the cost/return logic of joining an insurgency 
thus affecting the opportunity structure (Collier & Hoeffler 2004, Hendrix 2010).  The reader 
must therefore consider that the causal mechanism between GDP and conflict is not singular 
when reviewing the results of the analysis.    
     
As for state stability I have chosen to use the same kind of variable as for example Hegre et al 
(2001) and Fjelde (2010) which is a decay variable of time since last regime change. The value 
of this variable decreases the longer it has been since a country experienced transition. The exact 
formula is 2^(-durable/3), where durable is the Polity IV variable that gives the years since last 
regime change, and 3 is the half time parameter. It makes sense to think that the longer a regime 
has lasted the more stable it is. I call the variable state instability, as a greater value equals 
greater instability.  
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An alternate and perhaps better measure of state stability exists in Scalar Index of Polities (SIP) 
dataset, which measures the inconsistency and stability of political regimes through tracking 
irregular leader entry (Gates et al 2006). However, again the data only extends to the year 2000. 
 
 
3.4.4 Ethnicity 
 
The importance of ethnicity as an explanatory variable is been subject to discussion for some 
time. However, it has been found to be robust for low scale conflicts for a long time (Hegre & 
Sambanis 2006). However, recent research has also found it to be significant in explaining civil 
war (Cederman et al 2009). 
 
On ethnicity there are several options but I have chosen to go with GROWup Ethnic Power 
Relations data (Cederman et al 2010b, Hunziker 2013). The reason for choosing this data is that 
it gives information not only on the ethnically composition of a country, but also on the power 
relation between ethnic groups. That is the relative sizes of the groups in power vs the entire 
population as well as the same for groups that are excluded from power. This gives the 
possibility of accounting for the role of the state and nationalism in the relationship between 
ethnicity and political conflict, and is therefore in my view a step up from simply measuring 
diversity, as diversity alone does not necessarily lead to conflict. The GROWUP data contains 
many measures of ethnic phenomena. I have chosen to use the variable the indicates the size of 
the excluded population as a predictor of conflict as this variable should theoretically affect 
several kinds of conflict, while other variables in the dataset are more specific. The variable takes 
values between 0 and 1 where the value indicates the portion of the population of a country that 
is excluded relative to the total population (Hunziker 2013). In order to facilitate interpretation a 
categorical variable was assembled. It takes the form of a 10 point scale ranging from 0 to 9 
where 0 indicates that zero % of the population is part of a politically excluded ethnic minority, 1 
indicates that up to 10% are excluded, 2 that between 10% and 20 % are excluded, 3 that are 
between 20% and 30% are excluded etc. This makes it much easier to understand the effect of 
ethnicity in terms of incidence rate ratios, as they are given at one change in the value of the 
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independent variable. An important note on ethnicity is that different numbers of excluded 
people have been found to be linked to different conflict types (Cederman et al 2009). This 
means that I do not expect a linear relationship between this conflict variable and conflict.  
 
 
 
3.5 Reliability and Validity 
 
 
Above I discussed several problems with the sources and the method of gathering the data on 
conflict. As they are coded from news there are considerable problems with the reliability of the 
conflict data. For reasons of policy towards press freedom, differences in press coverage due to 
differences in wealth, as well as the effect of the internet are all likely problems in the data. This 
means that the data does not optimally represent the real nature of conflict, as there are 
considerable numbers of incidents that are never reported. However, it does not seem possible 
that these issues can be avoided as long as the coding relies on news reports, and any other 
source seems unlikely, at least for automatically coded data.    
 
As for validity, there is little reason to suspect that the data is not valid. Wrongful reporting of 
conflict events is quite easy to expose, and not tolerated in journalist circles. Beyond this, any 
editorializing is impossible within the format that TABARI uses to code the data. As long as one 
is clear on the fact that GDELT lists single events of violence and not entire conflicts the data do 
measure what they are meant to measure.   
 
 
 
3.6 The Regression Model 
 
The analysis is a series of zero inflated negative binomial regressions. One regression model was 
fitted for each of the categories presented above, so that the differences in the effect of regime 
and control variables between them can be assessed. Zero inflated negative binomial regression 
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is a statistical method that is intended for use on count data that has excessive amounts of zero 
values, and is over dispersed. The inflation model assumes that independent variables have 
different effect on whether there are any above zero values, and how many above zero values 
there are. This aspect of the model must be stressed. The model assumes that a zero value can be 
the result of two different processes. In one proses a zero value is ‘certain’ or at least very likely, 
these are known as ‘excess zeroes’. In the case of this analysis, an excess zero is the result of a 
country year where there is no opportunity or reason for conflict. In the second proses, a zero 
value is not ‘certain’, but occurs for different reasons. In the case of this analysis, a country year 
can have opportunities, but still not see conflict. The assumption is then, in terms of government 
and conflict, that variables can affect conflict in different ways. They can simultaneously have 
effects on the likelihood of excess zeroes, or initiation of conflict, and on the number of events, 
the scope of conflict. The zero inflated model conceits of two parts, a binary to model the excess 
zeroes and a count model to model the counts. In this case, the binary model is an ordinary 
logistic regression model, and the count model is a negative binomial model. The logistic model 
predicts the log likelihood of a value being an excess zero, while the negative binomial model 
predicts the number of counts. Therefore, the logistic model cannot be interpreted like a normal 
logistic model. It does not predict the odds of conflict, but the odds of a zero value being an 
excessive zero value. Therefore, if an independent variable, say GDP, has a negative coefficient 
then the log odds of conflict increases with GDP, and vice versa. In this analysis, for example, 
regime is seen to have first an effect on the probability of triggering conflict, then a separate 
impact on the probability of how many conflicts occur. The count model in this paper is a 
negative binomial model, which is an adaptation of a regular Poisson count model intended to 
account for over dispersion of the data. The regression expression is defined as:  
 
 
As all the variables in the analysis are thought, in theory, to potentially affect conflict onset in 
both as a trigger and an escalating variable, they are therefore all included in both models.   
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In the theory section, I mentioned that Krain (1998) recreated the analysis of Powell (1982) 
because he wanted to apply more apt analysis tools to Powell’s (1982) data. This serves as a 
good example of the utility of event count models. Powell (1982) used ordinary least squares 
regression to analyze event counts, which holds several problems. First OLS regression assumes 
negative values, which of course do not exist in event data. Second OLS assumes that a change 
in a variable from say 54 to 55 is the same as a change from 0 to 1 which with event data is 
unrealistic. For example, the difference between there having been one incidence of armed 
fighting and there having been none is arguably more significant than the difference between say 
three and four incidences. What is more, zero inflated event count models use probability 
distributions that account for the vast majority of observations having zero values. The data used 
in this paper is a typical example, each observation is a country year, and most have zero of any 
of the types of events that I am looking at.  
 
Bagozzi (2011) makes an inquiry into the aptitude of zero inflated count models for predicting 
conflict. Using different conflict data, that was also coded with the TABARI program using 
CAMEO structure, he finds that the predictive capability of the zero inflated model is 12% better 
than that of a normal count model. He also finds that lagged conflict variables in zero inflated 
models improved the models significantly (Bagozzi 2011). Bagozzi (2011: 26) explains this by 
showing that the positive effect of recent conflict is exaggerated when models do not account for 
zero inflation.   
 
Instead of a count model, it is quite common to define the dependent variables as dummy 
variables where conflict onset is coded 1, and then analyze this data using a logistic model. 
However, I have chosen to use a count model as I think it should be able to model the 
relationship of the variables more accurately.  
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3.7 Descriptive Statistics. 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max Variance 
Protests 6493 22.5 148.3 0 6087 22012.64 
Violent Protests 6493 22.4 105.6 0 3391 11058.97 
Small Scale Violence 6493 13.4 68.3 0 2443 8741.887 
Asymmetric 6493 21.2 156.5 0 4151 18827.87 
Military 6493 101.2 578.0 0 21291 334139.6 
Unconventional Mass 
Violence 
6493 0.37 2.4 0 168 8.823956 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Variance 
Democracy 10721 0.774 0.417 0 1 0.174 
Anocracy 10721 0.059 0.235 0 1 0.059 
Authoritarian 10721 0.166 0.372 0 1 0.138 
GDPPC 9626 8.342 1.234 4.888 13.357 1.522 
Population(ln) 9626 8.460 2.129 1.791 14.096 4.533 
Ethnicity 10721 1.48 2,168 0 9 4.700 
State Stability 5339 0.229 0.334 4.27e-21 1 0.111 
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3.8 Assumptions of the Model & Other Challenges 
 
Negative binomial regression assumes that the data are clustered around the lower values just 
like in Poisson regression. However, negative binomial regression does not follow the exact 
same probability function as Poisson regression, but assumes that the data are highly dispersed. 
What this means in praxis is that the variance of the dependent is expected to be greater than the 
mean. In my case it is for all variables. 
 
Several of the variables have been changed for the analysis to deal with various methodological 
problems. First, the dependent variables have been time lagged in order to prevent problems 
where last year’s conflict affects this year’s conflict, creating serial correlation due to 
endogenous data. The time lag is of 1 year. Secondly GDPPC and Population has been given at 
their natural log because the effect of these variables are likely logarithmic. This also helps to 
facilitate interpretation of the model as the coefficient for one$ change would likely be minute 
and therefore difficult to interpret.  
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4.0 Analysis & Discussion 
 
In this section of the paper the results of the analysis will be presented and discussed. As this 
paper seeks to analyze six different types of conflict a separate model was constructed for each. 
The first step shows some bivariate relationships between regime and conflict. For step 2 a zero 
inflated negative binomial regression model was constructed for each of the dependent variables. 
Apart from the dependent these models were all exactly the same, using every one of the control 
variables discussed in the methodology section. The zero inflated negative binomial regression 
model can be interpreted in a number of ways. First, I will consider the negative binomial and 
logistic regression coefficients, and significance levels. As a note, the negative binomial 
coefficients indicate the change in log count with one change in the independent variable. The 
logistic coefficients indicate the change in log odds of being an excessive zero with one change in 
the independent variable. Then I will move on to consider predicted counts from the negative 
binomial model and predicted probabilities of excess zeroes from the logistic model.  
Finally, step 3 seeks to explain unexpected findings in step 2. This step explores the possibilities 
of methodological problems in the analysis, and tests for possible interaction and curvilinear 
effects as well as influential cases.   
 
This section will begin with presenting the results of the analysis for the various models. Then 
discuss the results, and finally conclude. 
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Table 3: Regression Models for Step 1 
 Protests Violent Protests Small Scale 
Violence 
Asymmetric Violence Military Violence Massive 
Unconventional 
Violence 
 Model  1 Model 2 Model 3 Model  4 Model 5 Mdel1 6 
 Nb Log Nb Log Nb Log Nb Log Nb Log Nb Log 
Democracy 0.473***                  -20.901     0.489***  -21.526  1.004***  n/a 1.516***  -22.410  1.171***  -14.450  0.116       -0.992**  
 (0.079) (3079) (0.097) (9241.2) (0.070)  (0.089) (45373.5) (0. .0632) (300166.2) (0. .193) (0.380) 
Anocracy 0.295**                    -20.093  0.473***  -22.395  0.989***  n/a 1.580***  -22.832  1.135***  -14.808  0.474**             -18.186  
 (0. 111) (6430.8) (0.097) (20573.8) (0.105)  (0.128) (93137.3) (0.095) (645881.3) (0.236) (5916.4) 
Constant 2.785                    -1.437***  2.739***  -2.895***  1.708***  n/a 1.688 ***  -4.496*  3.564  -17.493  -0.818***  0. 008    
 (0. 066) (0.157) (0.055) (0.452) (0.055)  (0.074) (3.385) (0.049) (483.004) (0.193) (0. 305) 
N 4822 4822 4822 4822 4822 4822 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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4.1 Step 1 
 
Step one shows some simple binary relationships between regime and conflict. In this step six 
such binary models were constructed one for each dependent variable.  
 
I will discuss the results by the independent variables. Beginning with democracy, we see that 
the logistic coefficient for predicting excess zeroes is insignificant in table 3 model 1. The 
relationship is negative, meaning that democracy increases the chance of conflict initiation. 
Towards the counts the relationship is however positive, and significant at the 0.01 level. The 
coefficient is 0.47 meaning that the log count of protests is .047 higher in democracies than 
authoritarian regimes, which is the reference category. For violent protests, model 2, the same 
direction and significant persists. The effect of democracy is insignificant in the logistic part. The 
effect of democracy is slightly stronger in affecting violent protests counts. The protest 
categories support the hypothesis about the effect of democracy. Democracies see more protests 
in accordance with H1, and fewer violent protests in line with H2.  
 
Moving on to small-scale violence in model 3, we see that the effect of democracy is positive, 
significant at the 0.01 level in predicting the number of counts. What is more, the positive effect 
of democracy on small-scale violence is stronger than its effect on protests. The recent wave of 
riots and similar events was mentioned as part of the motivation behind this paper. In that regard, 
it is interesting to see that the effect of democracy on this kind of violence is positive and quite 
strong. This finding does not support H2, that democracy will see fewer violent conflicts. 
However, it does not entirely erode it as these are still not very grave forms of violent conflict. 
The model predicting small-scale violence is a normal negative binomial model as the Vuong test 
showed that a zero inflated model is not an improvement on a standard model in this case. 
However, if we look at the effect of democracy in the more serious conflict categories, in model 
5 and 6, we see that the effect of democracy is positive and significant towards the number of 
counts here as well. The effect is strongest for asymmetric violence at 1. 516, in model 4. In the 
prediction of excess zeroes all the relationships are insignificant. This is a quite unexpected 
relationship. From theory and previous research one would expect democracy to have a negative 
effect on these kind of conflict (Hegre et al 2001, Hegre & Sambanis 2006, Collier & Rhoner 
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2008). The model predicting massive unconventional violence is not significant, see appendix D. 
 
Moving on we can judge the effect of democracy in relation to the effect of anocracy. Form 
theory we should expect anocracy to have a stronger positive effect on conflict than democracy. 
We find the expected relationship in most of the models. Democracy has a stronger positive 
effect towards conflict than anocracy. Democracy also has a stronger effect towards counts of 
small-scale violence, which is somewhat unexpected. However, anocracies have more counts of 
asymmetric, military and mass unconventional violence according to the model.  
 
How can these unexpected findings be explained? It could be that the effect of regime is 
contingent on other variables. For example, the negative effect of democracy on conflict is often 
thought to be contingent on wealth (Collier & Hoeffler 2004, Hegre & Sambanis 2006, Gratzke 
2007). This is the limit of a bivariate analysis. You may find relationships between the two 
variables that are in fact spurious, and an effect of another variable not accounted for. In step two 
the same models are constructed using all the control variables discussed in the methodology 
section, GDPPC, ethnicity, regime instability and internet bias.  
 
 
4.2 Step 2 
 
The regression coefficients for step two are reiterated in table 4. The first thing that should be 
noted about them is that the number of observations (N) is smaller in this step than for step one. 
The reason for this is that the coverage of the control variables is not as good as that of the 
dependent and explanatory variables. 
 
Table A1 in the appendix shows the significance levels, Vuong test, Chibar2 and alpha values of 
all the models. All models are significant. The Vuong test indicates whether a zero inflated model 
is a better fit than a normal negative binomial model. Alpha is the log of the dispersion parameter 
and Chibar2 indicates the probability that a zero inflated Poisson regression would be a better fir 
than a zero inflated negative binomial model. All tests indicate that the models are a good fit.  
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Table 4: Regression Models from Step 2 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p< 
 Protest 
 
Violent protest Small-Scale Violence Asymmetric Violence 
 
Military Violence Massive unconventional 
violence 
 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 Nb Log Nb Log Nb Log Nb Log Nb Log Nb Log 
(Ln)Population 0.551*** -1.077*** 0.519*** -1.314*** 0.523*** -1.096*** 0.550*** -1.349*** 0.603*** -1.363*** 0.124*** -0.702*** 
 (0.0169) (0.077) (0.0161) (0.0952) (0.0200) (0.0732) (0.0256) (0.108) (0.0195) (0.119) (0.0408) (0.0767) 
(Ln)GDPpc 0.433*** -0.369*** 0.243*** -0.453*** 0.0133 -0.325*** 0.220*** -0.369*** 0.00128 -0.705*** -0.186*** -0.0850 
 (0.0237) (0.081) (0.0213) (0.0965) (0.0261) (0.0842) (0.0305) (0.0960) (0.0225) (0.152) (0.0713) (0.0867) 
Anocracy 0.0114 -0.167 0.238*** -1.866** 0.661*** -0.507 0.812*** -1.273** 0.767*** 0.0822 0.326 -1.045*** 
 (0.0853) (0.334) (0.0729) (0.795) (0.0899) (0.434) (0.107) (0.596) (0.0838) (0.705) (0.229) (0.310) 
Democracy 0.123** -0.454** 0.0557 0.593** 0.762*** 0.755*** 0.760*** 0.542** 0.845*** 0.927*** 0.220 -0.334 
 (0.0600) (0.201) (0.0541) (0.268) (0.0654) (0.214) (0.0771) (0.270) (0.0577) (0.327) (0.195) (0.231) 
Ethnicity 0.0956*** -0.00461 0.139*** 0.126*** 0.131*** -0.0422 0.214*** 0.0994** 0.210*** 0.155*** 0.0961*** -0.0908** 
 (0.0126) (0.0374) (0.0115) (0.0435) (0.0146) (0.0406) (0.0168) (0.0476) (0.0131) (0.0548) (0.0340) (0.0403) 
State Instability 0.809*** -1.069*** 0.633*** -1.088** 0.677*** -0.859*** 0.754*** -0.563 0.794*** -1.594*** -0.339 -1.103*** 
 (0.0871) (0.344) (0.0796) (0.424) (0.0950) (0.325) (0.114) (0.424) (0.0864) (0.592) (0.248) (0.380) 
Internet Bias 0.0925*** -0.119*** 0.0863*** -0.0970*** 0.0611*** -0.0869*** 0.0944*** -0.0440*** 0.0620*** -0.152*** 0.0576*** -0.0346** 
 (0.00281) (0.0112) (0.00250) (0.0119) (0.00315) (0.00988) (0.00353) (0.0114) (0.00278) (0.0206) (0.0120) (0.0145) 
Constant -8.933*** 13.21*** -6.571*** 14.02*** -5.079*** 12.04*** -7.814*** 13.52*** -4.102*** 15.59*** -1.060 9.706*** 
 (0.276) (1.037) (0.240) (1.187) (0.295) (0.976) (0.359) (1.275) (0.266) (1.616) (0.697) (0.938) 
N 4,697 4,697 4,697 4,697 4,697 4,697 
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Beginning once again with the effect of democracy, we see that the coefficients in model 13 in 
step 2 is significant at the 0.05 level and that the effect is negative. A negative effect means that 
democracy decreases the odds that a zero value is an excessive zero, and thereby increases the 
chance of conflict initiation. The corresponding negative binomial coefficient shows that 
democracy is positive and significant, which means that democracies see a larger count of 
protests than authoritarian regimes. This is as expected in H1. In model 8 we see that effect of 
democracy on violent protest is positive and significant in predicting excess zeroes. The effect of 
democracy on the number of violent protest counts is not significant.  
 
In model 9 small-scale violence is affected by democracy in a more peculiar way. The effect on 
the chance of an excess zero is positive and significant. In the count model, democracy also has a 
significant and positive effect. This difference in direction of effect is interesting. It means that 
democracies on the one hand affect that chance of there being any small-scale violence 
negatively, and the amount of small-scale violence positively. This is strange as we should in 
theory the relationships would seem most likely to have the same direction. However, this is not 
an indication that the zero inflated model is poorly fitted, as the zero inflated model assumes that 
this kind of relationship is possible.  
 
Similarly, I find in model 10 that democracy has a positive and significant effect on both parts of 
the model. Which means that democracies have a larger probability of avoiding conflict, while 
they at the same time have a larger count of violent events when conflicts occur. This finding 
contradicts H2, that democracies will see fewer violent conflicts. That said, as I discussed in the 
theory section the findings on the relationship between democracy and asymmetric violence is 
not robust across different analyses. Also the theory points to both positive and negative effects 
of democracy, this find does not seem so strange in that light. 
 
For military conflicts, I find a relationship that is strange. As with small-scale violence, 
democracy has different effects on excess zeroes and counts here. In model 11 the effect on the 
likelihood of excess zeroes is positive, as is the effect on the counts. The effect of democracy is 
therefore twofold here as with small-scale and asymmetric violence. What is more, democracies 
experience more counts of military violence than anocracies, which is unexpected and does not 
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support H2, or H3.   
 
In predicting massive unconventional violence, the effect of democracy is negative towards 
excess zeroes and positive for counts, however the effect is not significant.  
 
Comparing the effect of democracy with the effect of anocracy I find that anocracy does not have 
a statistically significant effect on protests.  Model 8 finds that anocracies impact the likelihood 
of excess zeroes negatively, and the number of counts of violent protest positively. The effect is 
significant for both coefficients. As the effect of democracy is insignificant on counts and 
positive on excess zeroes, I find that anocracies see more violent protests than democracies. This 
is in line with my expectations that violent conflict are more rare in democracies, H2, and that 
anocracies generally see more violent conflict, H3. 
 
Incidents of Small-scale violence are only affected by anocracy in the number of counts; the 
coefficient for excess zeroes is not significant. The effect on the counts is not as strong as that of 
democracy, Which I will return to in considering the incidence rate ratios below.  
Asymmetric events are according to model 10 more common in anocracies than in authoritarian 
regimes. In predicting excess zeroes the effect is negative and in predicting counts it is positive. 
The effect in the count model is very similar in strength to that of democracy.  
For military events anocracy is only a significant predictor of the number of counts, the effect is 
positive and stronger than the effect of democracy.  
Finally, anocracy reduces the chance of avoiding military events. It also increases the predicted 
counts, but this effect is not statistically significant.  
 
All in all the findings in step two are not in line with the expected relationships. Anocracy 
frequently has a smaller positive effect on violent forms of conflict than democracy. This means 
that violent conflict is found to be more common in democracies than anocracies. This erodes 
support for H2, and for H3. However step 2 does support H4, that authoritarian regimes should 
see less conflict counts than other regimes, as both the regime terms have positive effects.  
 
Finally, considering the control variables we see from the logistic coefficient for GDPPC that it 
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is a significant predictor of excess zeroes for all conflict types but massive unconventional 
violence. From theory, we should expect GDPPC to affect most conflicts negatively; however, it 
affects the likelihood of excess zeroes negatively for all conflict types, and is only insignificant 
towards small-scale and massive unconventional violence. Towards the number of counts 
GDPPC it is significant and positive for protests, violent protests and asymmetric conflicts. From 
theory I do, as mentioned, expect GDPPC to affect conflicts negatively. The effect is in fact 
negative on massive unconventional violence, and the effect is statistically significant. For 
military and asymmetric events, the effect is not significant. It might be that the positive effect of 
GDP here is explained by a correlation between GDPPC and democracy, where rich western 
democracies drive the findings in protests. So the findings for GDPPC are not that unexpected as 
it is only positive for protests and asymmetric conflicts. Protests are not very serious conflicts 
and the findings in previous research that indicate a negative effect of GDP are mostly taken 
from studies of civil war. As to asymmetric events, there is no consensus on the effect of wealth.  
 
Population on the other had taken on the expected relationship for all of the conflict types in the 
logistic part of the models. It is negative and significant in all logistic models, therefore 
increasing the chance of conflict. In the count model, population size has a corresponding 
positive and significant value in all models. This means that population size increases both the 
chance of initiation and the number of event counts. In the count model, its strongest effect is on 
military violence, although the effect is relatively even all over.   
The state instability decay function has the same effect as population, which is also expected. It 
is negative and significant in all logistic models except for asymmetric violence for which it is 
not significant. This makes sense as having a stable regime cannot necessarily aid a state against 
terrorism. The decay function is also positive and significant for all count models in step 2, 
except massive unconventional violence for which it is insignificant.  
 
In predicting excess zeroes ethnicity is significant and positive towards violent protests, 
asymmetric violence and military violence. It also has a significant negative effect on massive 
unconventional violence. Towards the number of counts ethnicity is significant and positive for 
every category. It is interesting that ethnicity has a dual effect on many variables, both increasing 
the probability of an excess zero and the expected number of counts. 
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Finally the control for internet bias works as expected and is negative and significant in all 
logistic models. In the count models it is also significant and positive in all models. This means 
that in general the number of events in the dataset increases the closer we get to the present.  
 
In order to more clearly show the differences in effects between the variables in the step 2 
models I will present a table of incidence rate ratios. A quick note on incidence rate ratios; what 
is refereed to as counts in event data is in mathematical terms ratios, i.e. the number of incidents 
in a given period of time. Incidence rate ratios are the ratio of incident rates between variables, in 
this case the ratio of event counts in country years (rates), between different variables. For 
example if democracy has an incidence rate ratio of 2 democracies have 2 times the counts of 
authoritarian regimes (the reference) as it is a dummy variable, all other rates held constant. If a 
continuous variable has an incidence rate ratio of 2 the number of counts increase by two for 
every level of that variable. 
 
In order to facilitate reading I have recoded the variables into standardized variables where the 
mean is zero and 1 = one standard deviation above the mean, 2 equals two standard deviations 
above the means etc. This means the there is no need to consider the different coding of the 
various variables, so that their respective strength can be compared directly. I have not recoded 
the regime variables in this way, as they are already dummy variables. In the table, the values 
therefore now show the ratio of event counts by one standard deviation change in the 
independent variables, except for the regime variables that show the difference in event counts 
between democracy/anocracy and authoritarian regimes. Since the incidence rate ratios, unlike 
the coefficients, have a multiplicative effect, values below one indicate a negative effect. 
It is also possible to interpret the strength of a relationship by the negative binomial coefficients, 
who indicate the change in the log of the count of a given country year given one increase in the 
independent variable. However, the increase in the log does not really tell us much as it is not a 
very intuitive measure.  
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Table 5: Standardized Incidence Rate Ratios for Step 2. 
 Protests Violent Pro-
tests 
Small-Scale 
violence 
Asymmetric 
Violence 
Military Vi-
olence 
Massive 
Unconven-
tional Vio-
lence 
Democracy 1.130* 1. 057 2.143* 2.137* 2.328* 1.246 
Anocracy 1.011 1. 268* 1.936* 2.252* 2.153* 1.385 
ZGDPPC 1.706* 1. 349* 1.016 1.311* 1. 001 0.795* 
ZPopulation 3.234* 3. 020* 3.042* 3.225* 3.606* 1.302* 
ZEthnicity 1. 230* 1.350* 1.328* 1.589* 1.575* 1.231* 
ZState In-
stability 
1.310* 1.235* 1.253* 1.287* 1.304* 0.892 
ZInternet 
Bias 
5.305* 1.090* 3.013* 5.488* 3.059* 2.826* 
Constant 1. 223* 1.222* 1.166* 0.743* 6.401* 0.312 
* P<0.05  
 
In table 5 we can see the incidence rate ratios for the negative binomial regression models in step 
2. Beginning with democracy again, we see that for all of the more severe forms of conflict 
where democracy is a significant predictor the effect stronger than the effect of anocracy, except 
for asymmetric effect where the ratio of anocracy is greater. The effect of democracy on protest 
is also stronger than the effect of anocracy, but this is expected from theory.  If we compare the 
effect of democracy and anocracy the three models where they are both significant, we see that 
democracy is about 0.3 stronger for small-scale and military events, while anocracy is about 0.1 
stronger for asymmetric events. The differences between the two variables are in other words not 
large. The most significant effect that we can take away from the findings in step 2 is that 
anocracies and democracies generally see many more conflict events than authoritarian regimes. 
The strongest effect of democracy is in military violence where democratic regimes have 2.328 
times as many conflict events as authoritarian regimes. A positive effect of democracy on these 
very serious event types is quite unexpected.  
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All the significant relationships with anocracy are also positive. While the effect is weaker for 
most conflicts than the effect of democracies, anocracies still see considerably more of all kinds 
of conflict than authoritarian regimes. The strongest effect of anocracy is on asymmetric violence 
where the incidence rate ratio is 2.252. The findings for anocracy are for the most part not 
surprising when viewed by themselves. Anocracy does as predicted have more conflict events 
than the reference, which is authoritarian regimes. However, in light of the effects of democracy 
it seems weak. Most of the theory reviewed in earlier (Hegre et al 2001, Hegre & Sambanis 
2006, Enia et al 2011) finds that anocracies are more prone to conflict than democracies. 
However most previous research has focused on one type of conflict (typically civil war) and has 
used datasets where one observation is one entire conflict and not single events of violence. 
Therefore, it is important to note that this does not say anything about which conflicts the various 
events are from.  
 
Finally, the control variables one can now compare their strength directly. It seems that 
population is the strongest predictor of conflict along with the internet bias variable. Ethnicity 
shows a very even effect across most conflicts. GDPPC does not show the expected effect on 
counts. It is positive on protests which is unexpected, but difficult to imagine. It may be that 
protest actions are more common in higher GDPPC countries because many of these countries 
are democracies. The explanation could be given of the fact that asymmetric violence is also 
more common in higher GDPPC countries. GDPPC does not have a significant effect on small-
scale and military violence, which is unexpected. Finally, the negative effect of GDP on massive 
unconventional violence is expected.  
 
4.2.1 Predicted Probabilities and Predicted Counts 
 
 
In order to go more in depth into the relationship between the independent variables and the 
dependent variables as well as to attempt to reveal any relationships between the independent 
variables I have used the regression models in step 2 to generate predicated probabilities and 
predicted counts. Just as you can use normal regression models to generate predicted values for 
the dependent, you can generate predicted probabilities of excess zeroes from the logistic, and 
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predicted counts from the negative binomial part of the zero inflated regression models. This 
makes it possible to show the predicted values of the dependent at different levels of the 
independent variables. 
 
Table 6 shows predicted probabilities of an observation being an excess zero, other values held at 
means. This helps to illustrate the effect of regime on these conflict types.   
 
 
Table 6 :Predicted Probabilities of Excess Zeroes From Step 2 
 Protest Violent 
Protest 
Small 
Scale Vi-
olence 
Asymmet-
ric Vio-
lence 
Military 
violence 
Massive Uncon-
ventional Vio-
lence 
       
Democracy 0.15* 0.13* 0.23* 0.20* 0.05* 0.72* 
Anocracy 0.18 0.03* 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.57* 
Authoritarian Regime** 0.35 0.19 0.25 0.23 0.11 0.81 
All other variables at their means. 
*P>0.05 in the logistic model from table* (for convince). 
**Authoritarian Regimes given by democracy and anocracy at 0, all other values at means. 
Note: remember that this is the predicted probability of an excess zero value.  
 
 
 
The results in table 6 are quite interesting if one compares them to the logistic coefficients from 
step 2. Keeping in mind that these are the probability of zeroes not of conflict we can see the 
relationship between the various independent variables in the model and not just the individual 
effects on the dependent. It also allows one to assess the strength of the effects and not just the 
direction.  
 
The predicted probabilities of democracy compared to those of anocracy are not in all cases as 
one would expect from the regression models. For protest, the chance of an excess zero is higher 
in anocracies than in democracies, which is as expected. The discrepancy between authoritarian 
and democratic regimes is large; democracies have a 15% chance of being an excess zero while 
authoritarian regimes have a 35% chance, more than twice as likely. Which supports both H1 and 
H4. The relationship would also support H3, but the effect of anocracy is not significant.  
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For violent protests the relationship is opposite, the chance of an excess zero is 10% higher for 
democracy than for anocracy. The probability is even higher for authoritarian regimes, which is 
in line with both H2, H3 and H4.  It is interesting that the relationship is so different from the one 
found by the incidence rate ratios. However, the effect of anocracy in the logistic model is 
insignificant.  
 
Small-scale violence also has the same relationship with regime, the greatest probability of an 
excess zero value is authoritarian regimes, followed by democracy and finally anocracy. 
Meaning the greatest chance of small-scale violence lies in anocracies, and the smallest in 
authoritarian regimes. However, the relationship with anocracy is insignificant.   
 
For military conflicts, the relationship is the same, but the difference between democracy and 
anocracy is much smaller, 0.01. Once again, the relationship with anocracy is not significant 
however. This is interesting in light of the unexpected findings from the count model. 
Democracy was found increase the likely number of military events, but has the opposite effect 
in the logistic model, although the difference between democracy and anocracy is not large and 
there is still a considerable gap to authoritarian regimes.  
 
The same relationship also repeats for massive unconventional violence where that chance of an 
excess zero is 15% greater for democracies than for anocracies, and 24% greater for authoritarian 
regimes. This gives support to H2, H3 and H4, as the relationship is significant and in line with 
what was predicted in the hypothesis.  
 
 
 
4.2.2 Predicted Counts 
 
Using the margins command in STATA one can obtain the predicted counts of a negative 
binomial regression at various values of independent variables. Table 7 displays the predicted 
counts of the dependent variables for democracies, anocracies and authoritarian regimes. All 
other variables where set to their means. The purpose of this table is to make clear the difference 
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in effect between the three forms of regime; as such, the total count is not as interesting as the 
difference in courts between the regimes. However as the other variables are at their means if 
there are interaction effects between any of them and regime this could affect the predicted 
counts. The margin command also sets the probability of an excess zero at it mean. It is therefore 
wise to keep the incidence rate ratios in mind when viewing the predicted counts, as the 
predicted counts show the effect of regime for an average country year rather than by it self. In 
addition to the incidence rate ratios, predicted counts allow us to see the effect of one variable at 
different levels of other variables. In the table, all variables are given at their means. I will first 
consider the effects in the table then move on to test the effects of regime at different levels of 
other variables in order to try to illustrate potential co variance between the independent 
variables.  
 
Table 7: Predicted Counts From Step 2 
 Protest Violent 
Protest 
Small 
Scale Vi-
olence 
Asymmet-
ric Violence 
Military 
violence 
Massive Unconven-
tional Violence 
       
Democracy 5.22* 7.50 5.79* 5.93* 43.74* 0.17 
Anocracy 4.45 9.50* 5.93* 6.94* 40.72* 0.32 
Authoritarian Regime 4.40 7.28 2.96 2.91 18.91 0.10 
All other variables at means. 
*P>0.05 in the negative binomial model. 
Authoritarian Regimes given by democracy and anocracy at 0, all other values at means. 
Predicted Probabilities of Excess zeroes at means.  
 
The expected counts for protests is relatively uniform with democracy expecting almost one 
more count. This finding supports H1& H4 but none of the other hypothesis, as only the effect of 
democracy is significant.  
 
For violent protests, however we see that anocracy has a slightly higher expected count than 
democracy, while authoritarian regimes have an even smaller count. This is exactly in line with 
the predictions of the hypothesises, anocracies see more protest that turn violent than other 
regimes.  
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Small-scale violence shows a more expected difference between the regime types; authoritarian 
regimes have a much smaller predicted count than democracy and anocracy. That authoritarian 
regimes have fewer of these kind of events is expected and supports H4. In regard to asymmetric 
violence, the difference is also unexpected in regard to theory.  
 
Asymmetric events seem to be more common in anocracies according to the model. Anocracies 
about 1 more predicted count than democracies. Once again authoritarian regimes have the 
fewest counts. 
 
Military violence shows the most unexpected number of counts. First of all, all three counts are 
incredibly high. Second, democracy has a higher count, at 43, than the other regime types, 
anocracy 40, and authoritarian 18. The fact that democracies have a larger predicted count of 
military conflicts is in itself strange. The most likely explanation is that there are simply very 
many counts of military violence in the data compared to other variables. If one recalls the 
descriptive statistics the mean of the dependent variables are all around 15 except military 
conflict, which is 77.  
 
Possibly this could be due to the press bias in the data discussed earlier. Military conflicts are 
bigger news than most other conflict types; therefore, they may be overrepresented in the data. 
Alternately, since all other values are given at their means, one of the control variables could 
have a curvilinear relationship with military conflicts. If this is the case it could have the greatest 
effect at a mean value and drive the results, as the counts are generally very large not just for 
democracy. Finally, it is important to remember that these are not 43 counts of civil wars but 43 
counts of military violence. As an example of what an actual civil war would look like in the 
data, the largest count of this category is Syria 2013(2012 because of time lag) with 21 thousand 
counts of armed violence. Syria serves a good example, as it is one count of civil war and 21 
thousand of armed conflict. It is also a conflict that has been given a lot of media coverage, and 
which is contemporary. In comparison, the Nicaraguan civil war took place at the start of my 
dataset from 1979 to 1991. There are just under 2500 reports of military violence in Nicaragua 
for all of those years in the dataset. Even though the Nicaraguan civil war was not as severe as 
the Syrian one is, this still illustrates the difference in reporting.   
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Finally, Massive unconventional violence shows the expected distribution of predicted scores. 
Anocracies have the largest score followed by democracy, then authoritarian regimes. The scores 
for this category are also by far the smallest in general, which makes sense, as these events are 
(luckily) quite rare.  
 
 
In summery the expected relationship was found for protests, violent protest, asymmetric and 
massive unconventional violence. While small scale, and military violence shows unpredicted 
relationships. Regime does not seem to explain massive unconventional violence where both 
regime variables are insignificant.  
I find support for H1 In step 2 democracies have a higher effect on protest and decrease the 
chance of an excess zero value.  
Many of the relationships in step 2 are unexpected. The relationship found in the logistic parts of 
the models are very different form the one in the count part. The logistic relationship is far more 
expected from theory, while the positive effect of democracy on military, small-scale and 
asymmetric violence in the count model is unexpected. It is manly the findings concerning 
military violence that are difficult to explain. As democracies seem to have more excess zero 
values for the most violent conflict types and is an insignificant predictor of violent protest it is 
not unexpected that it should have a positive effect in the count model. This merely indicates that 
democracies see more counts than the reference, which is authoritarian regimes. However, the 
effect of democracy on the counts of military violence is stronger than anocracy as well, which is 
more difficult to explain. The same is true of small-scale violence, but the violence types 
included in this category are not as organized, grave or generally detrimental to society as the 
asymmetric and military categories. That said the finding is still contrary to what I expected from 
theory. H2 Stated that democracies should see fewer violent conflicts than other regimes. This is 
true according to the prediction of excess zeroes, which means that the chance of never seeing 
any conflict at all is larger in democracies than other regimes. I must be mentioned though that 
for military conflict non of the regime types had large probabilities of never seeing conflict.  
However, democracies that are not in the excess zero category see more events of violent conflict 
than other regimes. Therefore, support for H2 is mixed taking all the models in step two in view. 
Another possible explanation of the generally large counts of military violence, and the 
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unexpected effect of democracy towards it, could be that there are influential outliers that are 
driving the results. In this case democracies that have unusually high counts of military violence. 
I looked at the data and found that there are certain democracies that have very high counts of 
military violence. They include mainly the countries Israel, Pakistan and the US. Pakistan has a 
very high count of 11 thousand, which could be a result of the war against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan spilling over the border, also the US drone program. More worryingly, The USA 
have amongst the highest counts of military violence in the data set in 2011. Other western 
democracies such as the UK and France also have worryingly high counts. This means that there 
are problems with the data for these countries. One probable explanation is that events that have 
taken place in Iraq or Afghanistan have been wrongfully coded as an events on US, UK or 
French soil. A similar pattern exists for the data on small-scale violence where the largest counts 
are also India, Pakistan, Israel and The US in the last four years.   
 
Another possibility is that armed gang violence has been wrongfully coded as military. As 
civilians have been sorted out from my data in the Python script this is not due to my coding of 
the variables and must have happened in the coding of the original data. I also used the location 
code tied to the action and not the actors specifically to avoid actions taken by an actor in another 
country appearing as an event in their country of origin. In addition to the effect of democracy, 
the positive effect of GDP on conflict is unexpected. I have already speculated that as some 
research has shown (Collier & Rhoner 2008, Dixon 2009) the negative effect of both these 
variables may exist only if they work in conjunction. The unexpected results of democracy could 
also very well be due to the nature of press reporting and the freedom of speech. What is more a 
quick google search of internet coverage will show anyone that the majority of internet users live 
in the west, which means that there could be a colinearity  between democracy and the internet 
bias as well. Add this to the assumption that press coverage is also correlated with wealth and 
that many democracies are wealthy and there could be systemic bias towards democracies in the 
data.  
 
 Another possibility is that the unexpected effect of democracy is in fact an unexpected effect for 
anocracy. Anocracies are mainly thought to be prone to conflict because they are not 
consolidated regimes and thereby unstable. Could it be that the relatively weaker effect of 
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anocracy on conflict is a result of anocracies only seeing more conflicts when they are unstable?   
H3 is also partially supported. While democracies do see more counts of military and small-scale 
violence, they also have a higher chance of excess zero values for these categories than 
anocracies. This means that on the one hand democracies will see fewer country years with this 
conflict type, but more events in the country years that do have them. Anocracies however have 
fewer excess zero values and more counts of violent protest and asymmetric violence, therefore 
evidence for H3 is mixed.  
 
H4 Is supported for every conflict type. Authoritarian regimes see fewer counts and more excess 
zero values for all conflict types.  
 
In regard to the control variables the positive effect of GDP has already been mentioned, but also 
the dual effect of the ethnicity scale is unexpected. It is frequently positive and significant in both 
models. This is true of democracy in some cases too. Since the logistic model shows the log odds 
of being an excess zero that means that, a positive effect indicates a negative effect on conflict. 
When the variable is positive in both models this then means that it has the opposite effect in the 
two parts of the models. This does not indicate that the model is poorly fitted, as it assumes that 
the effect of independent variables will be different in each model, but how can this effect be 
explained? Why should the log odds of an excessive zero increase the more people are excluded 
from politics on ethnic grounds? There is a strong possibility that the effect of ethnicity is 
curvilinear and that the effect is strongest at different levels of excluded populations for different 
conflict types. This is because the relative strength of and excluded ethnic minority can influence 
their goals and strategy, so that for example small minorities may choose asymmetric approaches 
while large may choose military (Buhaug 2006, Cederman et al 2009).  
 
 
 
 
4.3 Step 3 
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In order to attempt to explain some of the unexpected findings from step 2 I construct a final set 
of models where I test for the effects suggested above.   
First, I test for an interaction effect between democracy and GDP in all models. The reason for 
this is that democracy has been found in previous research to only have a negative effect on 
conflict in conjunction with wealth (Collier & Rhoner 2008, Dixon 2009). If this effect exist in 
my data as well, we should see a positive and significant interaction term between democracy 
and GDP.  
In order to test for the effect of outliers in the data on small-scale military violence I construct a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if a country year has more than 4000 counts of military violence, 
and a a variable that = 1 if a county year has more than 500 counts of small-scale violence. There 
are in total only 8 observations of this scale all form Israel, Pakistan and The US, and in the 
period from 2008 to 2011, and all democracies. The reason that these variables were set to these 
values is that at above 4000 and 500 events respectively there are no other countries represented 
in the data and very few observations. These values then represent a break in the data between 
the cluster of observations around the mean and the extreme values of these countries. If the 
variable contributes to the high count for democracy we should see a significant and positive 
effect in the negative binomial part of the model. Most likely they will be significant but their 
strength should tell me something about their total effect.  
I also test for the possible curvilinear effect of ethnicity. I test for this by including an intercept 
term in the models where ethnicity has a dual effect. This term equals the ethnicity variable 
squared.  
In order to test if there is a reporting bias directed towards democracies I create a second 
interaction term between democracy and the internet bias variable to see if democracies have a 
larger increase in events by year than other regimes.  I include this term in all models. 
Finally, I test to see if there is an interaction between instability and anocracies in all models.  
 
 
Table 8 displays the results of model 3 where interactions between regime and instability, 
democracy and GDP and democracy and internet bias is tested.  I will first deal with the effect of 
the new terms included in step 3 in all models, then I will deal with the models that showed 
unexpected results in step 2 more in depth. 
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Beginning with democracy and its interaction term with GDPPC. Either democracy or the 
interaction term is now insignificant towards counts in every model. It is significant towards 
explaining excessive zeroes in the models for protest (model 13), small-scale (model 15), 
asymmetric (model 16), and military violence (model 17). In all of the models, the base term for 
democracy is now negative, while the interaction with GDPPC is positive. This means that the 
effect of democracy by itself is positive towards conflict initiation, but the effect of democracy 
becomes negative towards conflict with higher GDPPC. This is an interesting find considering 
that GDPPC had an unexpected positive effect on conflict in step 2. It would seem that it is the 
combination of democracy and GDPPC that explains conflict initiation best, while it makes no 
contribution to explaining the number of counts. As either the interaction or basic terms of the 
interaction are insignificant, the relationship between GDPPC and democracy does not explain 
the dual effect of democracy. It would seem that this effect is not due to analytical problems.  
The outlier term included in the model explaining military violence is insignificant in the logistic 
and significant in the count part of model 17. The effect of the outlier variable is very strong 
relative to the other variables with a coefficient of 3.46. Democracy is no longer significant in 
the model. However the insignificance of democracy is due to the interaction with GDPPC, when 
I tried to remove this interaction from the regression democracy was significant along with the 
outlier variable. This means the outliers do not explain the entire effect of democracy only a 
large part of it. 
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Table 8: Regression Coefficients from Step 3 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p 
Table 
 
Protests Violent Protests Small-Scale Violence Asymmetric Violence Military Violence Massive Unconventional 
Violence 
 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
 Nb Log Nb Log Nb Log Nb Log Nb Log Nb Log 
(Ln)Population 0.552*** -1.265*** 0.514*** -1.368*** 0.477*** -1.208*** 0.551*** -1.535*** 0.566*** -1.428*** 0.111*** -0.675*** 
 (0.0168) (0.101) (0.0170) (0.109) (0.0203) (0.0875) (0.0259) (0.146) (0.0192) (0.123) (0.0424) (0.0708) 
(Ln)GDPpc 0.382*** -0.686*** 0.191*** -0.832** -0.0833** -0.923*** 0.147*** -1.056*** -0.0818** -1.616*** -0.227** 0.353** 
 (0.0423) (0.157) (0.0383) (0.341) (0.0394) (0.220) (0.0468) (0.334) (0.0330) (0.385) (0.115) (0.149) 
Anocracy 0.0901 2.071*** 0.268*** -2.526** 0.566*** -1.478* 0.462*** -2.981** 0.647*** -0.197 -0.331 -1.230*** 
 (0.114) (0.555) (0.0975) (1.080) (0.117) (0.839) (0.137) (1.377) (0.112) (0.877) (0.296) (0.405) 
Democracy -0.645 -5.019*** -0.550 -2.991 -0.306 -5.199*** 0.0577 -5.571** -0.0890 -8.752*** -0.537 4.688*** 
 (0.430) (1.766) (0.386) (2.657) (0.417) (1.857) (0.504) (2.572) (0.357) (3.209) (1.151) (1.471) 
Ethnicity 0.156*** 0.144 0.241*** 0.230 0.395*** 0.102 0.448*** 0.248 0.485*** 0.198 0.163* -0.208* 
 (0.0329) (0.148) (0.0309) (0.147) (0.0376) (0.123) (0.0444) (0.159) (0.0345) (0.177) (0.0925) (0.114) 
State Instability 0.941*** -0.394 0.667*** -1.047** 0.666*** -0.738** 0.579*** -0.717 0.685*** -0.724 -0.816*** -1.602*** 
 (0.101) (0.353) (0.0925) (0.439) (0.107) (0.339) (0.134) (0.497) (0.0954) (0.512) (0.282) (0.459) 
Internet Bias 0.0945*** -0.124*** 0.088*** -0.089*** 0.065*** -0.077*** 0.099*** -0.031** 0.062*** -0.140*** 0.061*** -0.039*** 
 (0.00283) (0.0126) (0.00267) (0.0133) (0.00318) (0.0105) (0.0035) (0.0134) (0.00279) (0.0190) (0.0119) (0.0140) 
GDP*Dem 0.0890* 0.534** 0.0703 0.462 0.115** 0.747*** 0.0736 0.780** 0.0919** 1.257*** 0.0839 -0.614*** 
 (0.0504) (0.209) (0.0457) (0.358) (0.0490) (0.242) (0.0587) (0.345) (0.0418) (0.434) (0.140) (0.178) 
Instability*Anocracy -0.519*** -37.71* -0.195 1.083 -0.0197 0.692 0.618** 1.165 0.174 -1.054 1.730*** 1.374* 
 (0.200) (21.37) (0.190) (1.658) (0.223) (1.185) (0.259) (1.911) (0.209) (1.615) (0.536) (0.767) 
Ethnicity2 -0.00945** -0.0205 -0.0155*** -0.00893 -0.0380*** -0.0138 -0.037*** -0.0117 -0.044*** -0.00469 -0.0129 0.0168 
 (0.00464) (0.0220) (0.00432) (0.0189) (0.00510) (0.0176) (0.00662) (0.0221) (0.00485) (0.0230) (0.0119) (0.0153) 
Outliers     2.901*** -15.28   3.467*** -15.57   
     (0.505) (8,365)   (0.531) (27,128)   
Constant -8.632*** 17.14*** -6.204*** 17.06*** -4.098*** 17.26*** -7.394*** 19.82*** -3.184*** 22.60*** -0.546 6.320*** 
 (0.388) (1.720) (0.341) (2.808) (0.390) (1.960) (0.466) (3.120) (0.340) (3.206) (0.940) (1.221) 
Observations 4,697 4,697 4,697 4,697 4,697 4,697 4,697 
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The interaction term between anocracy and the instability function is only an improvement in 
predicting counts of model 16, asymmetric violence. Instability has additional positive effect 
towards asymmetric events for anocracy. This means that the unexpected findings in regard to 
democracy cannot be attributed to anocracies.  
 
The squared term of ethnicity is insignificant towards explain excess zeroes in all models, but 
significant in explaining counts in all models, except model 18 massive unconventional violence. 
Recalling the results of step 2 ethnicity had a dual effect in the models predicting violent protest, 
asymmetric and military violence. In these models we see that this dual effect can be explained 
by curvilinearity in these models. In all the models the basic term is positive while the interaction 
is negative. This means that these conflict types are more common in countries where the 
excluded part of the population is smaller, at a certain size the effect of ethnicity flattens.  
 
Finally, I specified a whole range of models where I tested for an interaction between democracy 
and the internet bias. However, only a few if the models were significant, and those who were 
predicted that democracies gained more zero counts with time relative to other regime types. The 
unexpected findings regarding democracy and violent conflict can therefore not be explained by 
the internet bias. For the regression table see Table A4 in appendix D.   
 
Now the only unexpected find from step 2 that remains is the unexpected difference in strength 
between democracy and anocracy for small-scale and military violence. In both step 3 models 
the outlier term is significant and strongly positive. The democracy term is also as mentioned 
insignificant, but not due to the outliers. In order to isolate the effect of the outliers I specified 
the models without the insignificant interactions with regime. The coefficients and incident rate 
ratios can be seen in table 8.   
 
 
 
 
75 
 
Table 9: Coefficients and Incident Rate Ratios for Respecified versions of model 15 and 17. 
 Small-scale Violence 
Coefficients 
Military violence 
Coefficients 
Small Scale 
Violence 
Incidence Rate 
Ratios 
Military 
Violence 
Incidence Rate 
Ratios 
 Model  15 Modified Model 17 Modified Model  15 
Modified 
Model 17 
Modified 
 Nb Log Nb Log Irr Irr 
Democracy 0.657*** 0.641*** 0.665 0.814 1.897 1.946 
 (0.212) (0.064) (.057) (.313) (0.122) (0.112) 
Anocracy -0.528 0.624*** 0.749 0.045 1.866 2.116 
 (0.407) (0.088) (.082) (.671) (0.164) (0.174) 
GDPPC -0.320*** 0.003 -0.0164 -0.703 1.003 0.983 
 (0.0819) (0.025) .(022) (.145) (0.025) (0.021) 
Population -1.106*** 0.471*** 0.566 -1.315 1.602 1.762 
 (0.0739) (0.020) (.019) (.110) (0.032) (0.034) 
Ethnicity 0.0720 0.391*** 0.482 .053 1.478 1.619 
 (0.123) (0.037) (.034) (.170) (0.055) (0.056) 
State Instability -0.867*** 0.603*** 0.670 -1.594 1.827 1.955 
 (0.314) (0.092) (0.084) (.579) (0.168) (.165) 
Internet Bias -0.0824*** 0.063*** 0.060 -0.149 1.065 1.062 
 (0.00974) (0.003) (0.002) (.019) (0.003) (0.002) 
Ethnicity2 -0.0155 -0.038*** -0.043 0.011 0.962 0.957 
 (0.0185) (0.005) (0.004) (0.022) (0.004) (0.004) 
Outlier -16.16 2.932*** 3.506 -15.083 18.763 33.346 
 (13.142) (0.500) (0.530) (28735.5) (9.380) (17.705) 
Constant 12.04*** -4.675*** -3.687 15.404 0.009 0.025 
 (0.952) (0.293) (0.260) (1.543) (0.002) (0.006) 
N 4697 4697 4697 4697 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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With the outlier variable in the regression, the effect of democracy is now smaller then that of 
anocracy for military violence while it remains stronger for small-scale violence.  It would seem 
then that though the outliers have a strong impact on the effect of democracy they cannot explain 
why democracy has a larger prediction of counts than anocracy in step 2. If the inclusion of the 
outlier variables had made the democracy variable insignificant I would be able to confidently 
claim support for H2. However, given the results, support is mixed. Part of the reason for this is 
that while these counts are very high and do influence the effect of democracy considerably one 
may still ask whether it is fair to consider them abnormal. After all, these observations are 
democracies and the do have high counts. Democracies still have more excess zero values, but 
the high count erodes support for H2.   
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5.0 Conclusion  
 
 
I have conducted an analysis of regime and conflict using event data and zero inflated negative 
binomial regression models. The purpose of the paper was to disaggregate conflict and see if 
findings from previous research would persist. The research question of this thesis was whether 
there are any kinds of conflict that are particularly common in democracies. Based on the 
analysis done here I find that non-violent protest actions are more common in democracies than 
other regimes. I also find that democracies have more counts of small-scale violence and military 
violence than other regimes. At the same time, democracies have more excess zero values of 
these conflict types and the counts are heavily affected by influential outliers. I addition the 
difference between democracies and anocracies are in any case not very large. Therefore, I 
cannot claim that these conflict types are particularly common in democracies. Therefore, while I 
did not find the exact relationship between democracy, anocracy and conflict predicted from 
theory, neither do I find relationships that go directly contract to them.  
 
The most persistent finding in the thesis is that authoritarian regimes have fewer conflicts than 
other regimes. They have both more excess zeroes and fewer counts for all conflicts.  
 
Table 10: Summary of Findings 
Hypothesis Step 1 Step2 Step 3 
H1 Supported Supported Supported 
H2 Mixed Evidence Mixed Evidence Mixed Evidence 
H3 Mixed Evidence Mixed Evidence Mixed Evidence 
H4 Supported Supported Supported 
 
 
In the introduction, I listed testing the feasibility of automatically coded event data in aiding the 
disaggregation of variables in conflict studies. It seems that it can indeed aid in disaggregating 
conflict, but there are several problems with this kind of data that needs to be accounted for. In 
the end it is a matter of how much one is willing to trust that the computer puts the events in the 
right category. In retrospect I should have taken greater steps to assure that this was the case, as it 
stands now I have no way of discovering with certainty weather strange patterns in the data are 
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natural or the result of coding bias. 
 
Also while this paper goes to significant lengths to disaggregate conflict it does little to 
disaggregate actors, regimes or spatial relationships. Event data have the potential to aid in the 
disaggregation effort. Disaggregating conflicts by type as done in this paper together with 
disaggregation of spatial dimensions to a sub-national level, and a clearer distinction of actors 
and their objectives will probably reveal relationships that are invisible at the monadic level. 
Such aggregation has been done before (Buhaug et al 2009, Collier & Rhoner 2008), but event 
data could potentially hold the key to doing it all at once. On a related note it may be that 
analysis using event data of this nature would benefit from including data on press and/or 
internet coverage as a control variable, given the large increase of counts towards the later years 
of the data and the nature of news as a source.  
 
Further research should expand upon the unexpected findings regarding democracy. Particularly 
events of the type included in the small-scale violence category. Event data allows the possibility 
of studding such low scale conflict together with non-violent political engagement and larger 
conflicts. With further disaggregation of conflicts, regimes and spatial dimensions, this could 
help explain in which situations dissidences choose which forms of political engagement whit 
greater accuracy than previous research.  
 
The positive relationship between democracy and small-scale violence that I find is only a 
correlation in one dataset. The small-scale category also includes several different types of 
conflict, which could possibly be governed by different logics. Case studies of democracy and 
these conflict types, or more narrowly focused statistical studies could add to this study by 
discovering the causal mechanisms that govern these conflicts. One particular part of the regime 
variable that ought to be disaggregated is the difference between institutional and liberal 
democracy. Some claim (Mousseau 2009) that the democratic peace is caused be liberal norms 
and liberal trade rather than institutional characteristics of democracies. It could be that the 
relationship between regime and small-scale conflict is tied to particular regime forms rather 
than the overarching typology of democracy, anocracy and authoritarian regimes.      
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix A: List of Conflict Variables.  
 
Variable 
Name 
CAMEO 
eventcode 
Description Category 
V3 140 Protest, political dissent, not specified Protest 
v4 141 Demonstrate not specified Protest 
v5 1411 Demonstrate for Leadership Change Protest 
v6 1412 Demons, policy Change Demonstrate for Policy 
Change 
Protest 
v7 1413 Demonstrate for rights Protest 
v8 1414 Demonstrate for Change in Regime Protest 
v9 1421 Hunger strike for leadership change Protest 
v10 1422 Hunger strike for policy change Protest 
v11 1424 Hunger strike for change in institutions/regime Protest 
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v12 1431 Strike for leadership change Protest 
v13 1432 Strike for policy change Protest 
v14 1434 Strike for change in institutions/regime Protest 
v15 1441 Obstruct Passage for leadership change Protest 
v16 1442 Obstruct Passage for policy change Protest 
v17 1444 Obstruct Passage for change in institutions/regime Protest 
v18 1451 Protest Violently for leadership change Violent Protest 
v19 1452 Protest Violently for policy change Violent Protest 
v20 1454 Protest Violently for rights Violent Protest 
v21 171 Size or damage property Violent Protest 
v22 1711 Confiscate property Violent Protest 
v23 1712 Destroy property Violent Protest 
v24 173 Arrest or Detain Violent Protest 
v25 176 Attack Cybernetically Excluded 
v26 180 Use unconventional violence, not specified  Small-Scale 
Violence 
v27 181 Abduct, Hijack or take hostage Asymmetric 
Violence 
v28 182 Physically assault, not specified Small-Scale 
Violence 
v29 1821 Sexually Assault Small-Scale 
Violence 
v30 1822 Torture Small-Scale 
Violence 
v31 1823 Kill, without weaponry Small-Scale 
Violence 
v32 183 Non- Military bombing, not specified  Asymmetric 
Violence 
v33 1831 Suicide Bombing Asymmetric 
Violence 
v34 1832 Vehicular bombing Asymmetric 
Violence 
v35 1833 Roadside Bombing Asymmetric 
Violence 
v36 1834 Location Bombing Asymmetric 
Violence 
v37 184 Use Human Shields Asymmetric 
Violence 
v38 185 Attempted Assassination Asymmetric 
Violence 
v39 186 Successful Assassination Asymmetric 
Violence 
v40 190 Conventional Military force, not specified  Military Violence 
v41 191 Impose Blockade Military Violence 
v42 192 Occupy territory Military Violence 
v43 193 Fight with small arms, and light weapons  Military Violence 
v44 194 Fight with artillery and armor Military Violence 
v45 195 Employ aerial Weapons, not specified Military Violence 
v46 1951 Precision-guided munitions Military Violence 
v47 1952 UAVs Military Violence 
v48 196 Violate Ceasefire Excluded 
v49 200 Massive Unconventional Force Mass Violence 
v50 201 Mass Expulsion Mass Violence 
88 
 
v51 202 Mass Killings Mass Violence 
v52 203 Ethnic Cleansing  Mass Violence 
v53 204 WMDs, Not specified Mass Violence 
v54 2041 Use Chemical, biological or radiological weapons Mass Violence 
v55 2042 Nuclear Weapons Excluded 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Python Scripts  
 
 
To export variables 
import glob 
import os 
 
 
headerFile = open("headers.txt","r") 
header = headerFile.readline().split("\t") 
 
os.chdir("[unpacked GDELT directory]") 
 
def fratil(a,b): 
    ran = range(a,b+1) 
    for i in range(0,len(ran)): 
        ran[i] = str(ran[i]) 
        while len(ran[i]) < 3: 
            ran[i] = "0"+ran[i] 
    return ran 
 
 
newFile = open("F****JoinedMk2.txt","w") 
 
 
for yearFile in glob.glob("*.csv"): 
    f = open("[unpacked GDELT directory ]"+str(yearFile),"r") 
    for line in f: 
        variables = line.split("\t") 
        if variables[header.index("EventCode")] in []:  
            if variables[header.index("Actor1Type1Code")] in 
["INS","OPP","REB","SEP"]: 
                newFile.write(line) 
            elif variables[header.index("Actor1Type1Code")] in 
["INS","OPP","REB","SEP"+ resten]: 
                newFile.write(line)  
         
    f.close() 
    print "file complete: "+str(yearFile) 
     
     
     
newFile.close() 
print "DONE!" 
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To create the country year dataset 
Created on Dec 17, 2013 
 
@author: Jo 
''' 
 
# Create the empty array named "currentYear" (country as row, eventcodes as columns) 
currentYear = {} 
eventcodes = 
["140","141","1411","1412","1413","1414","1421","1422","1424","1431","1432","1434","1
441","1442","1444","1451","1452","1454","171","1711","1712","173","176","180","181","
182","1821","1822","1823","183","1831","1832","1833","1834","184","185","186","190","
191","192","193","194","195","1951","1952","196","200","201","202","203","204","2041"
,"2042"] 
eventDict = {} 
for event in eventcodes: 
    eventDict[event] = 0     
countryFile = open("codes","r") 
countryList = [] 
for code in countryFile: 
    countryList.append(code[0:2]) 
    currentYear[code[0:2]] = dict(eventDict) 
 
 
# Open the datafile, and create a new file called landaar.txt 
dataFile = open("F:/GDELT_HISTORICAL/UNPACED/csv/Joined.txt","r") 
newFile = open("F:/GDELT_HISTORICAL/UNPACED/csv/landaar2.txt","w") 
 
endOfFile = False 
 
# Iterate through all years 
for year in range(1979,2014): 
    print "Currently processing year: "+str(year) 
     
    #Go through rows in the dataFile, until a row from the "next" year comes along  
    while True:  
        row = dataFile.readline() 
        if not len(row): 
            endOfFile = True 
            variables = [0]*100 
        else: 
            variables = row.split("\t") #Split the raw text row into a list 
containing all the variables 
         
        if int(variables[3]) == year: # Check which year 
            # Add 1 to the appropriate entry in currentYear 
            country = variables[51] #ActionGeo_CountryCode 
            eventcode = variables[26] 
            try: 
                currentYear[country][eventcode] += 1 
                #print "ADDED: "+country+ "  "+eventcode 
            except: 
                pass 
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        else: 
            # This row is the first of the new year, let's save the the previous 
years data, and clear the "currentYear" array 
            print "New year! Saving data to file..." 
             
            #Saving this years data into newFile and clear it (in the same loop!!!) 
            for country in countryList: 
                eventdata = [] 
                for eventcode in eventcodes: 
                    eventdata.append(str(currentYear[country][eventcode])) # List of 
this country's eventdata (ex.  [0  2 3   56   8 4..] ) 
                    currentYear[country][eventcode] = 0 #Clear the entry... 
                thisLine = country + "\t" + str(year) +"\t"+ "\t".join(eventdata) + 
"\n" #Construct the row... 
                newFile.write(thisLine) 
 
            # Add 1 to the appropriate entry in currentYear (This is the next 
year..!) 
            country = variables[51] 
            eventcode = variables[26] 
            try: 
                currentYear[country][eventcode] += 1 
            except: 
                pass 
             
            #Go the next year!!             
            break 
    if endOfFile: 
        newFile.close() 
        dataFile.close() 
        break 
 
Header text, country codes and country years 
Country codes 
AA 
AC 
AE 
AF 
AG 
AJ 
AL 
AM 
AN 
AO 
AQ 
AR 
AS 
AU 
AV 
AY 
BA 
BB 
BC 
91 
 
BD 
BE 
BF 
BG 
BH 
BK 
BL 
BM 
BN 
BO 
BP 
BR 
BT 
BU 
BX 
BY 
CA 
CB 
CD 
CE 
CF 
CG 
CH 
CI 
CJ 
CM 
CN 
CO 
CQ 
CS 
CT 
CU 
CV 
CW 
CY 
DA 
DJ 
DO 
DR 
EC 
EG 
EI 
EK 
EN 
ER 
ES 
ET 
EZ 
FG 
FI 
FJ 
FM 
FO 
FP 
FR 
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GA 
GB 
GG 
GH 
GI 
GJ 
GK 
GL 
GM 
GP 
GQ 
GR 
GT 
GV 
GY 
GZ 
HA 
HK 
HO 
HR 
HU 
IC 
ID 
IM 
IN 
IR 
IS 
IT 
IV 
IZ 
JA 
JE 
JM 
JO 
KE 
KG 
KN 
KR 
KS 
KT 
KU 
KV 
KZ 
LA 
LE 
LG 
LH 
LI 
LO 
LS 
LT 
LU 
LY 
MA 
MB 
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MC 
MD 
MF 
MG 
MH 
MI 
MJ 
MK 
ML 
MN 
MO 
MP 
MR 
MT 
MU 
MV 
MX 
MY 
MZ 
NC 
NE 
NF 
NG 
NH 
NI 
NL 
NO 
NP 
NR 
NS 
NT 
NU 
NZ 
OC 
OD 
OS 
PA 
PC 
PE 
PF 
PG 
PK 
PL 
PM 
PO 
PP 
PS 
PU 
QA 
RB 
RE 
RI 
RM 
RO 
RP 
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RQ 
RS 
RW 
SA 
SB 
SC 
SE 
SF 
SG 
SH 
SI 
SL 
SM 
SN 
SO 
SP 
ST 
SU 
SW 
SY 
SZ 
TD 
TH 
TI 
TK 
TN 
TO 
TP 
TS 
TT 
TU 
TV 
TW 
TX 
TZ 
UG 
UK 
UP 
US 
UV 
UY 
UZ 
VC 
VE 
VI 
VM 
VQ 
VT 
WA 
WE 
WI 
WS 
WZ 
YI 
YM 
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ZA 
ZI 
 
 
 
Country code file 
''' 
Created on Mar 23, 2014 
 
@author: Jo 
''' 
 
s = """GLOBALEVENTID    SQLDATE    MonthYear    Year    FractionDate    Actor1Code    
Actor1Name    Actor1CountryCode    Actor1KnownGroupCode    Actor1EthnicCode    
Actor1Religion1Code    Actor1Religion2Code    Actor1Type1Code    Actor1Type2Code    
Actor1Type3Code    Actor2Code    Actor2Name    Actor2CountryCode    
Actor2KnownGroupCode    Actor2EthnicCode    Actor2Religion1Code    
Actor2Religion2Code    Actor2Type1Code    Actor2Type2Code    Actor2Type3Code    
IsRootEvent    EventCode    EventBaseCode    EventRootCode    QuadClass    
GoldsteinScale    NumMentions    NumSources    NumArticles    AvgTone    
Actor1Geo_Type    Actor1Geo_FullName    Actor1Geo_CountryCode    Actor1Geo_ADM1Code    
Actor1Geo_Lat    Actor1Geo_Long    Actor1Geo_FeatureID    Actor2Geo_Type    
Actor2Geo_FullName    Actor2Geo_CountryCode    Actor2Geo_ADM1Code    Actor2Geo_Lat    
Actor2Geo_Long    Actor2Geo_FeatureID    ActionGeo_Type    ActionGeo_FullName    
ActionGeo_CountryCode    ActionGeo_ADM1Code    ActionGeo_Lat    ActionGeo_Long    
ActionGeo_FeatureID    DATEADDED""" 
 
list_s = s.split("    ") 
 
 
for i in range(0,len(list_s)): 
    if list_s[i] == "ActionGeo_CountryCode": 
        print i 
        break 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Header text 
GLOBALEVENTID SQLDATE MonthYear Year FractionDate Actor1Code Actor1Name
 Actor1CountryCode Actor1KnownGroupCode Actor1EthnicCode
 Actor1Religion1Code Actor1Religion2Code Actor1Type1Code Actor1Type2Code
 Actor1Type3Code Actor2Code Actor2Name Actor2CountryCode
 Actor2KnownGroupCode Actor2EthnicCode Actor2Religion1Code
 Actor2Religion2Code Actor2Type1Code Actor2Type2Code Actor2Type3Code
 IsRootEvent EventCode EventBaseCode EventRootCode QuadClass
 GoldsteinScale NumMentions NumSources NumArticles AvgTone
 Actor1Geo_Type Actor1Geo_FullName Actor1Geo_CountryCode
 Actor1Geo_ADM1Code Actor1Geo_Lat Actor1Geo_Long Actor1Geo_FeatureID
 Actor2Geo_Type Actor2Geo_FullName Actor2Geo_CountryCode
 Actor2Geo_ADM1Code Actor2Geo_Lat Actor2Geo_Long Actor2Geo_FeatureID
 ActionGeo_Type ActionGeo_FullName ActionGeo_CountryCode
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 ActionGeo_ADM1Code ActionGeo_Lat ActionGeo_Long ActionGeo_FeatureID
 DATEADDED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C: List of countries in Step 2 
Country 
Code 
Country Name 
2 USA 
20 Canada 
40 Cuba 
41 Haiti 
42 Dominican Republic 
51 Jamaica 
52 Trinidad 
70 Mexico 
90 Guatemala 
91 Honduras 
92 El Salvador 
93 Nicaragua  
94 Costa Rica 
95 Panama 
100 Colombia 
101 Venezuela 
110 Guyana 
115 Suriname 
130 Ecuador  
135 Peru 
140 Brazil 
145 Bolivia 
150 Paraguay  
155 Chile 
160 Argentina 
165 Uruguay  
200 UK 
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205 Ireland  
210 Netherlands 
211 Belgium 
212 Luxembourg 
220 France 
225 Switzerland  
230 Spain  
235 Portugal  
255 Germany *Bundesrepublik only 
290 Poland  
305 Austria 
310 Hungary 
316 Czech Republic 
317 Slovak Republic 
325 Italia 
339 Albania 
340 Serbia 
341 Montenegro 
343 Macedonia 
344 Croatia 
345 Yugoslavia 
347 Kosovo 
349 Slovenia 
350 Greece  
352 Cyprus  
355 Bulgaria 
359 Moldova 
360 Romania 
365 Russia 
366 Estonia 
367 Latvia 
368 Lithuania 
369 Ukraine 
370 Belarus 
371 Armenia 
372 Georgia 
373 Azerbaijan 
375 Finland 
380 Sweden 
385 Norway 
390 Denmark 
402 Cape Verde 
404 Guinea-Bissau 
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411 Equatorial-Guinea 
420 Gambia 
432 Mali 
433 Senegal 
434 Benin 
435 Mauritania 
436 Niger 
437 Ivory coast 
438 Guinea 
439 Burkina Faso 
450 Liberia 
451 Sierra Leone 
452 Ghana 
461 Togo 
471 Cameroon 
475 Nigeria 
481 Gabon 
482 Central African Republic 
483 Chad 
484 Congo Brazzaville 
490 Congo Kinshasa  
500 Uganda 
501 Kenya 
510 Tanzania 
516 Burundi 
517 Rwanda 
520 Somalia 
522 Djibouti 
530 Ethiopia 
531 Eritrea 
540 Angola 
541 Mozambique 
551 Zambia 
552 Zimbabwe 
553 Malawi 
560 South Africa 
565 Namibia 
570 Lesotho  
571 Botswana 
572 Swaziland 
580 Madagascar 
581 Comoros 
590 Mauritius 
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600 Morocco 
615 Algeria 
616 Tunisia 
620 Libya 
625 Sudan 
626 South Sudan 
630 Iran 
640 Turkey  
645 Iraq  
651 Egypt 
652 Syria 
660 Lebanon 
663 Jordan 
666 Israel 
670 Saudi Arabia 
679 Yemen *Republic of only 
690 Kuwait 
692 Bahrain 
694 Qatar 
696 UAE 
698 Oman 
700 Afghanistan 
701 Turkmenistan 
702 Tajikistan 
703 Kyrgyzstan 
704 Uzbekistan 
705 Kazakhstan 
710 China 
712 Mongolia 
713 Taiwan 
731 Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea 
732 Republic of Korea 
740 Japan 
750 India 
760 Bhutan 
770 Pakistan 
771 Bangladesh 
775 Myanmar 
780 Siri Lanka 
790 Nepal 
800 Thailand 
811 Cambodia 
812 Laos 
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816 Vietnam 
820 Malaysia 
830 Singapore 
840 Philippines 
850 Indonesia 
860 East Timor 
900 Australia 
910 Papua New Guinea 
920 New Zealand 
940 Solomon Islands 
950 Fiji 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D: Model Fit Tables 
 
 
 
Table A 1 Tests for Significance of Models in Step 1. 
Dependent variable Alpha Vuong 
Score 
Pr>Z Pr>chi-
bar2 
Prob>Chi2 
Protests (Model 1) 4.80 3.98 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Violent Protests (Model 2) 3.88    2.39 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Small Scale Violence (Model 3) 4.83      n/a n/a 0.000 0.007 
Asymmetric Violence (Model 4) 6.59    1.72 0.042 0.000 0.000 
Military Violence (Model 5) 1.38 28.35 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mass Unconventional Violence (Model6) 9.75    2.07 0.019 0.000 0.088 
Alpha = the log of the dispersion parameter. 
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Vuong Score and Pr>Z calculated from the Vuong test indicate the likelihood that a regular negative binomial model 
would be better suited than a zero inflated model.  
Pr>chibar2 indicates the likelihood that a Poisson model would be better suited than a negative binomial model. 
Chi2 indicates the likelihood that the model is not statistically significant.   
 
 
Table A2 Tests for Significance of Models in Step 2. 
Dependent variable Alpha Vuong 
Score 
Pr>Z Pr>chi-
bar2 
Prob>Chi2 
Protests (Model 7)    1.62    8.46    0.000      
0.000 
    0.000 
Violent Protests (Model 8) 1.61 8.34 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Small Scale Violence (Model 9) 2.08 8.86 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Asymmetric Violence (Model 10)   2.94 7.81 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Military Violence (Model 11) 2.35 6.35 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mass Unconventional Violence (Model12) 2.21 6.04 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Alpha = the log of the dispersion parameter. 
Vuong Score and Pr>Z calculated from the Vuong test indicate the likelihood that a regular negative binomial model 
would be better suited than a zero inflated model.  
Pr>chibar2 indicates the likelihood that a zero inflated Poisson model would be better suited than a zero inflated 
negative binomial model. 
Chi2 indicates the likelihood that the model is not statistically significant.   
 
 
 
 
Table A3 Tests for Significance of Models in Step 3. 
Dependent variable Alpha Vuong 
Score 
Pr>Z Pr>chi-
bar2 
Prob>Chi2 
Protests (Model 13)     1.67     8.97    0.000      0.000     0.000 
Violent Protests (Model 14) 1.61 8.44 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Small Scale Violence (Model 15) 2.10 9.16 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Asymmetric Violence (Model 16)   2.98 7.76 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Military Violence (Model 17) 2.23 6.86 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mass Unconventional Violence  
(Model 18) 
1.98 6.27 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Alpha = the log of the dispersion parameter. 
Vuong Score and Pr>Z calculated from the Vuong test indicate the likelihood that a regular negative binomial model 
would be better suited than a zero inflated model.  
Pr>chibar2 indicates the likelihood that a zero inflated Poisson model would be better suited than a zero inflated 
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negative binomial model. 
Chi2 indicates the likelihood that the model is not statistically significant.   
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Appendix E Alternate Models 
 
Table A4 Regression Models with an Interaction Term for the Internet Bias and Democracy 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Protests Violent Protest Small-Scale Violence Asymmetric Violence Military Violence Unconventional Mass 
Violence 
 Model 19 Model 20 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 
 Nb Log Nb Log Nb Log Nb Log Nb Log Nb Log 
Population 0.548*** -1.069*** 0.516*** -1.358*** 0.512*** -1.097*** 0.540*** -1.346*** 0.565*** -1.341*** 0.112*** -0.711*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0762) (0.0164) (0.108) (0.0203) (0.0767) (0.0259) (0.110) (0.0192) (0.113) (0.0430) (0.0861) 
GDPPC 0.428*** -0.339*** 0.238*** -0.415*** 0.0137 -0.308*** 0.223*** -0.335*** -0.0155 -0.652*** -0.204*** -0.0967 
 (0.0237) (0.0822) (0.0210) (0.101) (0.0258) (0.0865) (0.0305) (0.0974) (0.0220) (0.134) (0.0747) (0.0947) 
Anocracy -0.00812 0.179 0.168** -1.436 0.604*** 0.0176 0.677*** -1.183* 0.725*** 0.687 0.264 -1.137*** 
 (0.0883) (0.373) (0.0746) (0.958) (0.0917) (0.536) (0.113) (0.701) (0.0845) (0.698) (0.260) (0.386) 
Democracy 0.227* -1.426*** 0.491*** -0.233 0.865*** -0.277 0.905*** -0.135 0.819*** -0.0913 0.480 -0.237 
 (0.126) (0.377) (0.102) (0.453) (0.121) (0.375) (0.143) (0.491) (0.101) (0.433) (0.498) (0.674) 
Ethnicity 0.149*** -0.0159 0.247*** 0.238* 0.343*** -0.00391 0.444*** 0.189 0.480*** 0.00974 0.159* -0.195* 
 (0.0333) (0.128) (0.0307) (0.141) (0.0388) (0.126) (0.0450) (0.152) (0.0346) (0.165) (0.0962) (0.118) 
State Instability 0.784*** -1.159*** 0.604*** -1.256*** 0.618*** -0.971*** 0.723*** -0.546 0.674*** -1.651*** -0.363 -1.124*** 
 (0.0877) (0.378) (0.0796) (0.474) (0.0945) (0.365) (0.115) (0.447) (0.0845) (0.588) (0.249) (0.396) 
Internet Bias 0.0965*** -0.161*** 0.102*** -0.171*** 0.0703*** -0.156*** 0.106*** -0.0686*** 0.0656*** -0.226*** 0.0709*** -0.0277 
 (0.00468) (0.0196) (0.00371) (0.0348) (0.00441) (0.0274) (0.00523) (0.0225) (0.00385) (0.0367) (0.0227) (0.0289) 
Internet 
bias*democracy 
-0.00574 0.0762*** -0.0248*** 0.102*** -0.00838 0.0967*** -0.0144** 0.0441 -0.00871* 0.120*** -0.0133 -0.00404 
 (0.00570) (0.0240) (0.00474) (0.0386) (0.00561) (0.0302) (0.00665) (0.0269) (0.00497) (0.0411) (0.0227) (0.0306) 
Outliers         3.548*** -15.73   
         (0.531) (25,453)   
Ethnicity2 -0.00830* 0.00257 -0.0165*** -0.00772 -0.0319*** 3.64e-05 -0.0373*** -0.0119 -0.0433*** 0.0219 -0.00878 0.0156 
 (0.00473) (0.0181) (0.00436) (0.0194) (0.00535) (0.0185) (0.00671) (0.0222) (0.00489) (0.0224) (0.0123) (0.0156) 
Constant -8.956*** 13.35*** -6.825*** 14.31*** -5.252*** 12.38*** -8.008*** 13.41*** -3.754*** 15.60*** -1.112 9.765*** 
 (0.281) (1.034) (0.247) (1.303) (0.305) (1.020) (0.372) (1.315) (0.264) (1.511) (0.720) (0.971) 
             
Observations 4,697 4,697 4,697 4,697 4,697 4,697 
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Appendix F Download link to replication Data 
 
 
http://www.mediafire.com/download/kkih7qjkdr7srbb/ReplicationJHN.rar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
